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Introduction 
 
Due to my nationality and my interest in economic development, I am especially interested in 
the Hungarian privatisation, and in its effects on the performance of national and international 
companies on the Hungarian market. By analysing past developments we attempt to gain 
valuable insight in order to increase our understanding of what we can expect of future 
developments and how to improve decision taking as well as predictions; my study is aiming 
to contribute to research by analysing the historical developments of the Hungarian 
privatisation process. 
 
Does increased foreign ownership result in more profitable firms? What effects does the 
concentrated Hungarian ownership structure have on the largest companies? Did the 
companies “survive” the privatisation? What are the determinants of domestic ownership? I 
attempt to find answers to these, and many other questions, in the theoretical and empirical 
part of my thesis.  
 
In my study, I combined the Hungarian privatisation process with the empirical investigation 
of the 50 largest Hungarian companies. I was especially interested in the ownership structure 
and in the number of pyramid layers of the analysed firms. To cover the most characteristic 
part of the privatisation, I described the companies in two time periods of the year 1995 and 
the year 2003 through different variables. Therefore, I identified them within the time scale of 
eight years as core periods of the privatisation process. 
 
The present report consists of two main chapters. In the first one, I describe the Hungarian 
privatisation process in five main parts and summarise them separately with further prospects 
for the empirical part.  
 
In the second chapter, I describe each of the companies individually and divide them into five 
main sectors. In the followings, I create, describe and test 75 company variables with logistic 
regressions in order to evaluate the impact of the privatisation. The main source of my 
variable records was the database Amadeus, and I used the software program Stata_9 for 
statistical analysis. 
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1. The Hungarian Privatisation 
 
1.1 The Spontaneous Privatisation (1987-1990) 
1.1.1 Introduction 
 
Spontaneous privatisation is the process of getting multitudinous state property in public 
ownership. Both domestic and foreign individuals were involved, where valuable state assets 
were acquired on very beneficial conditions through the support of the management of the 
state owned enterprises.  
 
The spontaneous privatisation was driven by individual interest and characterised by the 
exploitation of opportunities, which were morally reprehensive but legally still possible. This 
process was carried out without any state control.1 At the beginnings, the main goal was not 
the privatisation itself, but the increase of firm profitability, the avoidance of bankruptcy and 
the modernisation of company structures.  
 
This procedure is combined with a rich historical background and followed by the changing 
of regime. I found it personally very interesting, because it shaped the direction of the 
privatisation from the very beginning. In the following section I describe the developments of 
the Hungarian banking system, the state owned enterprises, the introduction of foreign capital, 
the creation of Companies Act and the appearance of the opposition. 
1.1.2 Establishment of the Two-Tear Banking System 
 
The future economic growth was based on a stabilised and well developed banking system in 
Hungary. Therefore, it was a strong need for its reformation, because in the last four decades 
the National Bank of Hungary operated alone. This stood in contrast to the market economy 
acknowledged two-tear banking system, which was consisting of a central bank, commercial 
banks and other financial institutions. 
 
                                                 
1 Cp. Karsai (2005), p. 61. 
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The development of a new banking structure had its basics in 1987, when parts of the central 
bank were separated and transformed into commercial banks.2 It was a difficult start, because 
these commercial banks “inherited” the original clients and accounts from the central bank, 
which contained portfolios of corporate enterprises being in difficult financial situations, 
having bankruptcy and partly uncollectible claims.3 This lead to an economic absurdity, that 
the Hungarian commercial banks were established from debts instead of real capital.  
 
Hungary used to have problems with its banking system for many years; since the newly 
established banks remained weak and had to fight with continuous liquidity problems. Only in 
1993 the government spent around 300 billion HUF on bank consolidation4 and 
recapitalisation, described in greater detail in the Bank Consolidation section. 
1.1.3 State Owned Enterprises 
 
The state owned enterprises (SOEs) were characterised by the sole ownership of the state, 
they were called “[…] parts of the invisible state property”.5 Invisibility meant in this context, 
that even if the state had wanted to, it could not have sold its enterprises, because there was no 
such a regulation. As stated before the state had ownership rights over its businesses, but 
interestingly it was not accountable for their performance and liabilities.6
 
I find it also remarkable, that the director of a SOE had considerable rights; he alone could 
sign the contracts and sell formally 99% of the business all alone,7 which is considered to be 
highly unlikely today. 
1.1.4 Inflow of Foreign Capital & the Companies Act 
 
The development of companies’ law started in 1987 in line with the above mentioned 
development of banking system. This counts as a turning point, because it became clear, that 
state debt reached a critical level and only the inflow of foreign capital could save the state 
from national bankruptcy.8  
                                                 
2 Cp. Bagner/Kovacs (2004), p. 78. 
3 Cp. Kovács (2002), p. 49. 
4 Cp. Hungary in the XX. Century; the Privatisation and the Compensation (1). 
5 Cp. Mihályi (1997), p. 12. 
6 Cp. Mihályi (1997), p. 11. 
7 Cp. Mihályi (1997), p. 12. 
8 Cp. Liska (2005), p. 229. 
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 Interestingly the state has opened its doors to the inflow of foreign capital only from the 
beginning of the 80’s. Before this time it came into the country only through borrowing of 
foreign bank credits. The reason for the late appearance was that in state’s opinion foreign 
investments and capital would have led to a foreign exploitation of the country.9  
This statement turned out to be an inadequate economic decision, because by borrowing of 
foreign bank credits the money still flew into the country, but the state gave guarantee for its 
credit repayments as well. Therefore, it did not take into consideration the obvious fact that 
foreign bank credits just favoured foreign investors by eliminating their risk factor. If they 
made the investments themselves, the money would flow into the country as well, but the 
investors had to take at least their own risk.  
 
However, as mentioned before, by the end of the 80’s it became even more definite, that the 
country could not develop without the inflow of foreign capital. Therefore, a secure 
environment for ownership rights had to be created. To assure foreigners about the security of 
their investments, there was a strong need for well defined companies’ law and modern 
corporate forms.  
 
The Companies Act (CA) came into force at the beginning of January, 1989. Its early 
establishment explains that it did not have the intention to convert SOEs into privately owned 
ones; the creation of the law had only the aim to allow SOEs to establish privately owned 
mixed companies in cross-ownership, so that way banks, companies, foreign and domestic 
investors, corporate societies and other financial institutions would act as a collective 
enterprise.10 Accordingly, the newly created companies had complementary function only, 
they did not need the authorization of the state and they were free from its supervisory 
control, leaving this duty to the Registry Court. 
 
The laws of 1989 allowed finally the appearance of business associations and foreign 
investors in the Hungarian market,11 but at the same time no privatisation laws were created. 
In consequence, a significant loophole was created, which left the protection of the state 
property unattended.12  
                                                 
9 Cp. Hungary in the XX. Century; the Privatisation and the Compensation (1). 
10 Cp. Mihályi (1997), p. 13. 
11 Cp. Bagner/Kovacs (2004), p. 64. 
12 Cp. Bagner/Kovacs (2004), p. 49. 
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1.1.5 Corporate Duplication 
 
This “loophole”, mentioned above, contributed during these years to a heavy exploitation of 
state properties; the state lost a fortune, while management and executives got unfairly rich. 
SOEs participating in this process did not convert into private enterprises; they only used the 
law to transfer parts of their assets and financial sources in a limited or public company.  
 
The example of “corporate duplication” demonstrated this situation well, which was often 
used by retail companies, restaurants and other small companies.13 The following tactics 
could easily increase the wealth of some executives of SOEs and foreign investors without 
almost any kind of compensation to the state. They had established a business organisation 
with low share capital in a chosen corporate form (joint stock company, limited liability 
company), then they rented some properties of their SOE to the newly established company. 
In return of the properties the recently established company issued bonds, and gave them to 
the SOE as an exchange for its properties. Therefore, beyond the properties, the money was 
also converted to the newly established private company.14  
The process did not stop there, because in many cases the employees of the SOE were 
transferred to the new company as well. That way they could have been paid even a higher 
payment, because newly established and mixed companies benefited from tax savings.15 This 
transfer of employees was beneficial for the private owners additionally, since in the future, 
instead of the original length of the employment, just a lower severance payment was needed 
to expend for employee layoffs. 
 
These “rented” assets mentioned before had been built into the new company mostly by share 
capital increase, and then other new companies were established by the previous one, what 
made in the long-term the original financial standings untraceable and uncollectible. In the 
end the original SOE was left with debt obligations, credits and other liabilities, so it did not 
have any other chance than the liquidation. This process was transacted mostly legally in the 
existing legal environment; it was called financial know-how. 
Bagner/Kovacs (2004) summarises this process with the following words: “Basically this was 
how some 500 bankrupt, then liquidated or wound up companies were created, the assets of 
                                                 
13 Cp. Hungary in the XX. Century; the Privatisation and the Compensation (1). 
14 Cp. Bagner/Kovacs (2004), p. 63. 
15 Cp. Hungary in the XX. Century; the Privatisation and the Compensation (1). 
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which were lost to the public, and which were acquired for pittance by those who had the 
opportunity through various contacts or in more favourable cases through their 
resourcefulness, enterprising spirit and local knowledge”16. 
1.1.6 Opposition & the Road Followed by Changes 
 
The privatisation and liquidation of the above mentioned “empty” enterprises caused many 
problems for the later established State Property Agency. Nearly 250 companies were 
strongly affected by the corporate duplication within the spontaneous privatisation, and 
almost every company was involved in a minor or major part. According to estimations, it 
contributed with nearly 130 billion HUF of loss to the state.17
 
It is important to notice, that another possible way for the start of the privatisation could not 
have been easy, because in contrast to the estimated amount of state capital (2600 billion 
HUF) only a small amount (150 billion HUF) of liquid capital,18 available for privatisation, 
was in possession of Hungarian individuals. 
It is not without any reason that this period is considered as corrupt and immoral, and besides 
these negative effects on the state’s financial situation it contributed negatively to the personal 
attitude of the public as well.  
 
To be more precise, the main problem was not the fact itself, that state properties were 
transferred without any compensation to the ownership of private individuals (in other 
transition economies, like Czechoslovakia, the state gave almost half of its assets for free of 
charge to individual possession), but since the governance did not have any privatisation laws, 
it happened against its will. Large part of the “innocent” public was of course aware of this 
fact as well; they saw this injustice, and that only “insiders” could benefit through personal 
connections. This way the general public was precluded, and the privatisation lost reputation 
before it could really begin. 
 
The opposition against the spontaneous privatisation grew increasingly,19 and even more 
asked for immediate state intervention and control. Many political parties had their birth in 
                                                 
16 Cp. Bagner/Kovacs (2004), p. 24-25. 
17 Cp. Hungary in the XX. Century; the Privatisation and the Compensation (1). 
18 Cp. Belyó (2005), p. 100. 
19 Cp. Voszka (2005), p. 16. 
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these years, which encouraged individuals and also represented their will. The frequently 
attacks led finally to state intervention, it began to work on an equal privatisation system, 
which led in 1990 to the establishment of the State Property Agency.20 The spontaneous 
privatisation ended in 1990, but its problems remained unsolved till the privatisation laws of 
1992 (described in more detail in Modifications of the Companies Act). 
 
Because of the corruption and unethical behaviour of many, this period is called scandalous, 
but still it had some positive effects in the long-term. These included among others the 
appearance of private ownership and company forms, which were the prerequisite for the 
transition process. Furthermore, in these three years there was more foreign capital invested in 
Hungary than in the previous 15 years,21 which also contributed to the slow start of the 
Hungarian economic development.  
1.1.7 Summary and Future Prospects for the Empirical Part I 
 
This time is considered as a bridge between socialism and market economy; it was a period 
when the inflow of foreign capital was allowed to enter in larger volumes in Hungary.  
The appearance of foreign capital plays an important role in the empirical part of my study; I 
summarised its effects and gave an explanation for its determinants. 
 
On the one hand the establishment of the two-tier banking system can be treated as an 
advantageous step towards the development of the Hungarian market economy; on the other 
hand, due to the late establishment of banks, they were not able to give financial stability and 
efficient support to Hungarian firms. This is because banks themselves had to fight 
continuous liquidity problems. 
Their late developments explain why, in the middle of the 90’s, no bank belonged to the 50 
largest companies in Hungary (based on the sum of total assets), or to the largest shareholders 
of the first pyramid layer. 
 
SOEs were characteristic company types without existing legal forms; they were controlled 
directly by the state and by enterprise directors, who had the ultimate power to make 
decisions all alone.  
                                                 
20 Cp. Bagner/Kovacs (2004), p. 65. 
21 Cp. Hungary in the XX. Century; the Privatisation and the Compensation (1). 
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The later established Limited liability companies (Kft.) and Companies limited by shares 
(Rt.), as from SOEs transformed company forms, play major roles in my research study. 
 
The unfair and “illegal” events of the spontaneous privatisation led to the development of the 
opposition in Hungary. The actions of this initial phase resulted in high state losses, but 
compared to these losses, the negative long-term effects on the public opinion are the major 
damages. 
 
I believe that it is never enough to emphasize, that the privatisation process had lost its 
reputation before it really began. It was interlocked with corruption and politics from the very 
beginning. 
 
1.2 The Centrally Directed Phase of Privatisation (1990-1994) 
1.2.1 Incentives of the Government 
 
This period can be legally called as privatisation, which is the changing of state ownership to 
the benefit of private owners. In the meaning of the law the spontaneous “privatisation” can 
not be called privatisation, because no compensation value was received, which is one of its 
prerequisites.22  
 
The new government, led by the Prime Minister Jozsef Antall, identified as its main goal the 
creation of social market economy, and the privatisation was considered as its main 
instrument. The government had to face a difficult inherited economical situation, where the 
industry needed to be partially liquidated or modernized; furthermore, there existed a high 
unemployment rate, general capital shortage, undeveloped banking system, disused 
infrastructure and the collapse of the eastern marketplace. 23 The latter contributed for almost 
the half of the external trade. Last but not least, the state was left with a huge external dept of 
21 billion USD24 and just small monetary reserves with rising inflation rates.  
 
                                                 
22 Cp. Sárközi (2005), p 10. 
23 Cp. Liska (2005), p. 229. 
24 Cp. Hungary in the XX. Century; the Privatisation and the Compensation (2). 
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In contrast to the above mentioned difficulties the country had also some advantages over 
other transition economies. These were among others the liberalised external trade and foreign 
investments, two-tier banking system, stock exchange regulations and a well functioning tax 
system.  
The system of the state administration was also stabilised by the establishment of the 
Constitutional Court and the State Audit Office, which counted as powerful supervisory 
institutes. The State Audit Office became a fully independent organisation; it has a 
distinguished legal status and is responsible for the audit of “the asset-value maintenance and 
asset-increase activity of state-owned companies, enterprises”25. 
1.2.2 State Property Agency 
 
The State Property Agency was responsible for the support of the privatisation process. It 
began its functions under parliamentary control, and the board of directors became 
responsible for its management. The Agency had to create guidelines about the general 
concept of the privatisation and it also had to make annual plans for each year regarding the 
usage of privatisation revenues. It is still not obvious today, whether these guidelines were 
compensatory to follow or just showed a direction, but their yearly plans were usually far 
over- or underestimated.  
 
In the meaning of state ownership protection the Agency was in supervision of the transaction 
of SOEs and their subsidiary companies.26 Firms were obligated to announce special activities 
by the Agency, like the selling of more than 10% of company assets or more than 20 million 
HUF, the selling or leasing of company properties above 40 million HUF and the renting of 
more than 50% of the total assets listed in the balance sheet of the company.27 The limits of 
these regulations were applied for two whole calendar years.  
 
At the end of 1990 the position of the State Property Agency was strengthened; its status was 
modified to a separate institute with ownership rights. It gained more independence from the 
parliament and became the owner of the several SOEs; it received shares from its interest 
relations and assets from liquidated state companies as well. 
                                                 
25 Cp. State Audit Office of Hungary. 
26 Cp. Mihályi (1997), p. 13. 
27 Cp. Hungary in the XX. Century; the Privatisation and the Compensation (2). 
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1.2.3 Privatisation Process 
 
The Agency identified and accepted three main ways of the privatisation process. These 
were:28
 
• Active privatisation: it was supported directly by the state; the State Property Agency 
was in charge to offer SOEs for selling, reorganisation and trust management. 
• Self-privatisation: was the privatisation initiated by SOEs and societies; companies 
could work out their own privatisation program and then only the authorisation of the 
Agency was needed for its implementation.29 
• Privatisation by external initiatives: domestic or foreign individuals or groups along 
with investors could report individually their privatisation desire to the Agency. Of 
course acceptance of the Agency was needed again. 
 
In general the privatisation process went through two stages; first the state owned enterprises 
had to change their legal status, they needed to establish sufficient share capital and transform 
into a business association; second, after defining the competition rules the stocks and 
properties of the companies were ready to be sold legally.30  
 
Within the first years of its foundation, the assets of the State Property Agency were increased 
very fast, many SOEs got under its supervision and the newly transformed business 
companies increased its possessions as well. At the end of 1991 its belongings reached 
already near 300 billion HUF, and only half a year later its “wealth” was increased to 800 
billion HUF.31  
 
In order to support domestic investors, the government had a strong focus on the mass 
establishment of small and medium enterprises and it made use of the privatisation in order to 
support their participation.32 As a reaction to mass privatisation the body of foreign and 
domestic privatisation advisors was evolved. The importance of domestic advisors rose 
especially in the “self-privatisation” process. This process was used mostly by medium and 
                                                 
28 Cp. Hungary in the XX. Century; the Privatisation and the Compensation (2). 
29 Cp. Voszka (2005), p. 30. 
30 Cp. Bagner/Kovacs (2004), p. 50. 
31 Cp. Hungary in the XX. Century; the Privatisation and the Compensation (2). 
32 Cp. Bagner/Kovacs (2004), p. 66. 
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small firms, where the management chose its individual privatisation program in respect of 
the Agency’s framework and general rules. The self-privatisation process was considered very 
successful; only within two years it conducted the privatisation of 431 firms.33  
 
Another way of privatisation was the liquidation and final settlement. In interest of a fast 
transformation from socialism to market economy the government established a strict 
liquidation policy in order to reuse assets as fast as possible. This policy was disputed in many 
aspects, but at the end the policies led to a combined liquidation value of app. 350 billion 
HUF, which got back to some individuals in a very cheap way. 
 
The Small Investors’ Share Purchase Program (SISPP) was introduced in the early 90’s. It had 
the main goal of fastening up the privatisation process and increasing the number of minority 
shareholders. This program meant to support the privatisation, but it was beneficial for the 
state as well, because it wanted to sell its minority share portfolios, which were left from the 
investments of professional investors. These investors were generally only interested in the 
control of the companies; therefore they were completely satisfied with buying of 50% +1 of 
the shares. This program ran only two years long; until the next government with different 
privatisation principles came into power. Therefore the SISPP did not have much actual 
influence on the privatisation, but the damaging actions of the professional investors and the 
remaining minority portfolios set many problems in the later period.34
 
The Employee Part-Ownership Program (EPOP), the privatisation loans and leasing and the 
compensation vouchers were also essential parts of the privatisation process; they are 
described in later parts. 
1.2.4 Public Judgement of the Privatisation 
 
In line with the demonstration of the privatisation process it is also important to investigate its 
judgement and public opinion.  
 
These years were characterised by everyday political conflicts and misunderstandings, which 
made often an inconvenient pressure on the continuous work of the Agency, its labour force 
                                                 
33 Cp. Bagner/Kovacs (2004), p. 67. 
34 Cp. Bagner/Kovacs (2004), p. 68. 
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of 300 employees turned out often as not being sufficient.35 The Agency made big efforts on 
the information of opportunities and facts of the privatisation; hence the public opinion was 
disturbed by the feeling of unfairness.36 Due to this attitude many were disoriented and missed 
out from the privatisation.  
 
To avoid these problems and simultaneously to increase the investment sentiment within the 
country, the importance of “public teaching”37 of the privatisation was identified. This 
procedure demonstrated the possibilities and advantages of the privatisation, and intended to 
make it transparent and more understandable for the public and to familiarise its workflow for 
everyone. Publicity was obviously related to marketing, so the Agency got in touch with more 
than hundred NGOs, banks and foreign institutions in order to increase its reputation, and also 
huge amounts of money were spent on TV, radio or newspapers. 
 
All in one these endeavours were not unsuccessful, but they still were not able to 
communicate the main idea and the importance of the privatisation to many. One of the 
reasons was that the press was rather interested in scandals and continuous political conflicts 
instead of increasing its popularity. 
1.2.5 Modifications of the Companies Act 
 
Followed by the government incentives, mentioned above, a new program emerged to support 
the development of constant economic growth. Within this program were extensions and 
modifications of the CA created, and the privatisation process got also more stabilized. The 
alterations contained among others the protection of minority shareholders and the equal 
privileges of all companies incorporated in Hungary,38 regardless of their ownership type. 
 
A new privatisation institute, the Hungarian State Holding Company, was also established and 
put under state coordination.39 Its main duties included the supervision and management of 
state owned companies, which were planned to remain in a long-term state ownership. 
According to these changes, the SOEs were divided up by the ownership of the State Property 
Agency and the Hungarian State Holding Company. The Hungarian State Holding Company 
                                                 
35 Cp. Hungary in the XX. Century; the Privatisation and the Compensation (2). 
36 Cp. Bagner/Kovacs (2004), p 31. 
37 Cp. Hungary in the XX. Century; the Privatisation and the Compensation (2). 
38 Cp. Mihályi (1997), p. 17. 
39 Cp. Voszka (2005), p. 16. 
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became the owner of strategically important and profitable companies. They had the 
combined value of app. 1600 billion HUF, while the State Property Agency was left 
companies of lower volume with their combined market value of 800 billion HUF.40  
 
The activities of the Hungarian State Holding Company developed slowly. At the beginning 
its operations concentrated mainly on the exchange of compensation warrants against 
company shares. 
1.2.6 Bank Consolidation 
 
The other important issue of the program was the privatisation and consolidation of banks. As 
mentioned before, the Hungarian commercial banks were since their establishment in a very 
difficult economic situation with inherited and inefficient portfolios and insolvent clients. 
Most of the banks, also the largest ones, became bankrupt, and they needed to be recapitalised 
in order to survive. 
 
The first bank consolidation took place in 199241; when inefficient credits and insolvent 
clients were eliminated form the bank’s portfolios. There participated twenty commercial 
banks with the combined cost of app. 100 billion HUF. This process continued one year later 
with the consolidation of ten other banks, but this time it was not only a credit consolidation 
but also a debtor consolidation.42 This meant that the banks were given sufficient capital in 
the ratio of their inefficient credits, but it had to be transferred partial to their clients in form 
of client’s debt reduction, if they were only temporarily insolvent or had a reorganisation 
plan. 
 
The bank consolidation was expanded by its limits and it grew to a general reorganisation 
plan of many Hungarian companies having financial difficulties. Due to this support 
thousands of workplaces were saved and several strategically key companies survived (e.g. 
MÁV, and 15 others).43
 
                                                 
40 Cp. Hungary in the XX. Century; the Privatisation and the Compensation (2). 
41 Cp. Mihályi (1997), p. 22. 
42 Cp. Hungary in the XX. Century; the Privatisation and the Compensation (2). 
43 Cp. Hungary in the XX. Century; the Privatisation and the Compensation (2). 
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The bank consolidation continued also in 1994, and it increased the overall government 
spending of the last two years to 312 billion HUF. In line with this process the state 
ownership was increased in the banking sector up to 80%, but it quickly decreased to the 
original stand after the majority of the consolidated banks were privatised.44
 
All together in these four years almost 310 billion HUF of state properties were privatised, 
where a participation rate of 55% was achieved in favour to domestic investors, and foreign 
investors stayed in minority. These revenues were used for the establishment of public 
institutions, for the reorganisation of companies and financial institutions, for investment 
trusts and for budgetary payments. 
1.2.7 Summary and Future Prospects for the Empirical Part II 
 
This period is characterised by the stabilization of the Hungarian market economy and by the 
development of private ownership protection. 
 
The incentives of the government, to assist Hungary on its way of a fast development towards 
market economy, are clearly observable through the open and supportive decisions. Key state 
and administrative bodies were established; among others the Constitutional Court, the State 
Audit Office, the State Property Agency and the National Compensation Office. Moreover, 
the Budapest Stock Exchange was reopened. 
 
The newly founded State Property Agency and Hungarian State Holding Company (in line 
with their legal successor) operated as an owner and supervisor of the companies available for 
privatisation; these privatisation funds were one of the largest shareholders out of the 50 
largest analysed companies of my study. 
 
Bank consolidations took place in large numbers from the early 1992; which also explains the 
week position of Hungarian banks for many years. 
 
In my opinion it is especially important to mention that after the change of regime, the 
Hungarian government was offered to repeal all its current state debts, therefore, it could have 
                                                 
44 Cp. Bagner/Kovacs (2004), p. 79. 
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had a “clear” start on its way of the development, but the offer was rejected by the 
government.  
This attitude and pride was very characteristic considering the start of the privatisation, 
though many people think today that it was not the best economic decision. 
 
In the next part I describe the state’s main compensation and privatisation programs, which 
contributed to the development of small- and middle sized enterprises and domestic investors. 
These happenings still belonged to this period (1992-1994) chronologically. 
 
1.3 The Compensation Process 
1.3.1 Theory of the Compensation 
 
The compensation process did not mean that the state was just giving away its possessions for 
free; its goal was to compensate the ones who suffered from unfair expropriation of their 
private property between the years of 1939-1990. It applied also for others who had been 
illegitimate disposed from their freedom or even from their lives by the state because of 
political reasons.45
 
The injustice of the forcely shaped ownership rights of the past four decades was well seen by 
the majority of the Hungarians; it divided the public opinion into two standpoints.46 Some 
meant that socialism was just an unordinary episode in Hungarian history, therefore its 
regulations needed to be considered as invalid, and because the original ownership rights can 
not be lapsed they had to be restored. The other party rejected the restoration of original 
ownership rights completely. They were in complete agreement that in pursuance of the new 
constitution the unconstitutionality of previous laws can not be investigated. They 
acknowledged that the arrangements of socialism were objectionable and questionable; its 
laws were still valid. Therefore only moral recompense would be appropriate.  
 
The government came up with a solution between the two above mentioned viewpoints; it 
rejected the full reprivatisation (=restoring of original ownership rights) of private 
                                                 
45 Cp. Mihályi (1997), p. 24. 
46 Cp. Hungary in the XX. Century; the Privatisation and the Compensation (3). 
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properties47, but it issued compensation warrants as an instrument for compensation at the 
same time.  
1.3.2 Compensation Warrants 
 
The above mentioned compensation offered by the state could be just partial, because the state 
did not have sufficient monetary reserves.48 Only private persons could participate, legal 
entities were not allowed to, while its value was based on the size of the original ownership 
rights.49 The extent of the compensation was regressive, up to the value of 200 thousand HUF 
it was compensated by 100%, and then this percentage fell by risen original ownership 
measures.50 The maximal amount of the compensation was set by single assets and by persons 
to 5 million HUF. In case of owner’s decease the compensation rights were transferred to the 
offspring, in their absence to a wife or husband.  
 
The compensation voucher was a kind of bearer instrument; it could be used under restricted 
conditions for the following purposes:51
 
• for buying of state assets 
• for buying of agricultural lands (set by collective farms and state farmlands) 
• for buying of flats (offered by municipalities) 
• for refunding as life annuity 
• or they could be just sold as securities 
 
People were able to choose freely between the options listed above, and the State Property 
Agency established also investment trusts, where compensation warrants were accepted as 
well. Its aggregated value of app. 4 billion HUF was oversubscribed very fast.52
 
The National Compensation Office was established in 1992; its tasks included the issue of 
compensation vouchers, the consideration of compensation claims and the administration of 
                                                 
47 with the exception of patrimony. 
48 Cp. Bagner/Kovacs (2004), p. 51. 
49 Cp. Gidai (1996), p. 28. 
50 Cp. Hungary in the XX. Century; the Privatisation and the Compensation (3). 
51 Cp. Bagner/Kovacs (2004), p. 52. 
52 Cp. Hungary in the XX. Century; the Privatisation and the Compensation (3). 
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compensation workflows.53 The Office started its functions in the same year of its 
establishment with the emission of compensation notes in the app. value of 700 million HUF 
per month. This issue rose in the next two years to about 4 billion HUF, but at the end of 1994 
it went back to the original amount.54 This rise and fall was combined with the scarcity of the 
lands and properties available for privatisation, referred to later in this chapter.  
However nearly 1.8 million Hungarian reported their claims in an app. value of 300 billion 
HUF.55
 
The compensation voucher, given out by the National Compensation Office, was introduced 
in the stock market, and it turned out to be an important liquid security.56 In the next two 
years it accounted for app. 30% of total revenues of the stock market. The current rate of the 
compensation notes was influenced by the often changing share-list, which had the following 
tendency (see Figure 1): 
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        Figure 1: Changing Rate of Compensation Warrants 
        Source: Hungary in the XX. Century; the Privatisation and the Compensation (3) 
 
The volatile trend of the vouchers was abused by the secondary owners, described in greater 
detail in the Misleading Routes of the Privatisation. 
 
                                                 
53 Cp. Food and Agricultural Organisation of the United Nations. 
54 Cp. Hungary in the XX. Century; the Privatisation and the Compensation (3). 
55 Cp. Hungary in the XX. Century; the Privatisation and the Compensation (3). 
56 Cp. Bagner/Kovacs (2004), p. 51. 
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Owners of compensation vouchers held in their own right (= not the purchased ones) were 
able to exchange their notes for shares of newly privatised companies. Through this action the 
flotation of company shares was supported, it had a very positive effect on the development of 
the Hungarian capital market.57 Therefore the share trade boomed; especially the shares of the 
following companies: Pick, Danubius, Csemege Julius Meinl, Buszesz, Soproni Sörgyár, 
Prímagáz, Omker, OTP, Mol, MKB etc. were very popular among the compensation warranty 
holders. In sum almost 20 billion HUF of shares were sold what contributed to the appearance 
of many small stock owners.  
1.3.3 Ownership Rights of Municipalities 
 
Along with the compensation process an important law was enforced in 1991, it regulated the 
ownership rights of municipalities. Within this law the state owned buildings, flats, houses, 
internal lands and public utilities were transferred into their ownership while the ex-council 
enterprises were taken away from them and were privatised by the State Property Agency. In 
consequence, an estimated value of app. 4000 billion HUF was legally transferred to the 
municipalities.58  
 
In the meaning of the law, municipalities were remunerated after privatisations of SOEs 
located within their internal area. Therefore, the Agency had to pay municipalities 50% of the 
value for the construction land underneath the company (or business shares or stocks in the 
same value).59 A new line of privatisation driven by municipalities was started, which 
included the privatisation of flats in a very fast way. In cases of other assets the development 
was slower.  
 
In this regard, it is important to notice, that significant part of the compensation law focused 
on regulations of the agricultural land. If we get back to the original ways of the usage of 
compensation warrants, one way was to purchase agricultural lands with it. Collective farms 
and state farmlands were the ones to be in charge to appoint available lands for compensation. 
They were available for public auctions, and someone with the highest bid could actually buy.  
 
                                                 
57 Cp. Bagner/Kovacs (2004), p. 73. 
58 Cp. Hungary in the XX. Century; the Privatisation and the Compensation (3). 
59 Cp. Mihályi (1997), p. 24. 
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These auctions functioned quite well till the authorities started to run out of available lands for 
auction in the middle of 1993. The shortage had the effect that everyone was trying to get rid 
of the compensation warrants and buy lands at the same time, so the prices of them increased 
extremely fast. Therefore a big debate was caused by the scarcity of lands between politicians 
and experts.60  
 
Until 1994 about 21 thousand auctions took place, app. 35 billion HUF of compensation 
warrants were spent and 600 thousand people were able to buy a ground.61  
 
Another issue was raised by the increasing number of compensation warrants in the 
possession of cooperative societies and whether they can be used by them as a legal entity.62 
The Constitutional Court investigated this problem and made the decision, that cooperative 
societies as legal entities should be protected as well from unfair absorption of lands, so their 
compensation notes could be used for buying of state owned assets or could be sold on the 
free market. Compensation notes assembled by state institutions were immediately repealed, 
because they had already fulfilled their goal. 
1.3.4 Misleading Routes of the Privatisation 
 
The development of secondary owners of compensation vouchers gave a good example that 
the State Property Agency concentrated mainly on the issue of determinate amount of 
compensation warrants, but it did not play enough attention to the persons who really needed 
to be compensated and whether the compensation was equally distributed. 
 
A significant part of the people affected in the compensation was old or not well informed.63 
Therefore, they could only use their compensation notes in simple cases, like to exchange 
them for company shares, or they just sold them on the free market or on the Stock Exchange 
for cash, so they were left out from most of its benefits.64  
 
Another problem was, that at the same time the maximal compensation limit of 5 million 
HUF also did not represent a useable capital to acquire an enterprise, therefore a significant 
                                                 
60 Cp. Hungary in the XX. Century; the Privatisation and the Compensation (3). 
61 Cp. Hungary in the XX. Century; the Privatisation and the Compensation (3). 
62 Cp. Hungary in the XX. Century; the Privatisation and the Compensation (3). 
63 Cp. Bagner/Kovacs (2004), p. 72. 
64 Cp. Mihályi (1997), p. 19. 
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part of the compensation warrants were bought up by investors, who could participate that 
way in the privatisation process as well. These investors were called secondary owners of 
compensation warrants, and in many cases they were the only ones who could effectively 
participate in auctions. Often millions of HUF were needed to win a bid what precluded other 
bids limited by 5 million HUF. Buying up the compensation warrants was beneficial for the 
investors, because usually they bought them far under their nominal value, but they could sell 
them within the privatisation on its original value to the state. That way these investors made 
in a few years often an enormous profit of app. 150% on the business.  
That was definitely not what the Agency aimed for. 
1.3.5 Summary & Adjustment of the Compensation 
 
Despite of the positive achievements and the efforts of the state, the compensation policy was 
not politically successful. The public was in most of the cases unsatisfied, because compared 
to their original ownerships they were given only a limited compensation, and also not in cash 
but in complicatedly usable compensation warrants, whereas the ones not participating 
considered the compensation process only as a give away of commons for free.  
 
By all means the compensation and the regulation of ownership rights of municipalities and 
patrimonies made it clear and obvious, that the assets sold by the state are actually in the 
possession of the owners and can not be taken away, which created the prerequisite for the 
mass public privatisation. 
 
In the following sections the four main instruments, which supported the privatisation process 
are illustrated. These are the Start-up loan, the Privatisation loan, the Employee Part-
Ownership Program and the Privatisation leasing. 
1.3.6 Start-Up Loan 
 
Start-up loan (E-credit) was a credit facility developed only for domestic investors and offered 
by commercial banks and financial institutions after successful credit reconsideration. It could 
be used only by selling of state owned assets. The source of the start-up loan was the 
refinance credit offered by the National Bank of Hungary; its interest consisted of the 
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refinance interest and the interest margin of the commercial banks or financial institutions.65 
A minimal amount of initial capital was required for granting the credit; it could be paid in 
cash or in compensation notes as well.  
 
The credit terms were often modified in favour of the private persons between 1991 and 1995 
(with the exceptions of some restrictions of the last year)66. The interest rates and the height of 
initial capital were reduced, the initial maturities were lengthened and the number of entitled 
people and the upper limit of the credit were increased as well. It is interesting to observe the 
continuously falling development of the credit rate in Table 1.  
 
Year Inflation Rate E-Credit Rate Refinance Credit Interest Margin 
1991 35% 22% 18% 4% 
1992 28% 16.60% 12.60% 4% 
1993 25% 7% 3% 4% 
 
Table 1: Comparison of the E-Credit Rate with the Inflation Rate 
Source: Karsai (2005), p. 58, Hungarian Central Statistical Office (KSH) (1), Hungary in the XX. 
Century; the Privatisation and the Compensation (4). 
 
These changes applied ex-post from the date of the borrowing. So in 1993 a buyer had to pay 
only 7% of interest, whereas the annual inflation rate was about 25% and other usual bank 
credits around 35%. This was obviously a large state support which had the advantage of 
increasing entrepreneur spirit of domestic investors. 
 
At the beginning E-credit was mostly used for buying of retail firms and smaller catering 
companies, it was called preliminary privatisation,67 then its usage was extended also for large 
enterprises, when its credit terms were positively modified. Then in 1994 the new 
government, led by the minister president Gyula Horn, changed the previous privatisation 
policies and set the new goal of increasing cash-nature revenues, which resulted in restricted 
conditions of the start-up loan.68
 
                                                 
65 Cp. Voszka (2005), p 29. 
66 Cp. Hungary in the XX. Century; the Privatisation and the Compensation (4). 
67 Cp. Bagner/Kovacs (2004), p. 51. 
68 Cp. Hungary in the XX. Century; the Privatisation and the Compensation (4). 
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Commercial banks acted differently in the credit auditing process, some of them even used the 
start-up loan as part of their business policy. For example many obligated clients, who 
requested a credit, to open a bank account at their bank as well, or they just modified its credit 
terms to offer better conditions as the concurrence in order to “steal” the clientele.69 Some of 
these techniques were not illegal but still unmoral; they often led to scandalous cases which 
had a negative influence on the public opinion again (see among others the Tocsik-Scandal in 
later parts). 
 
Nevertheless, the presence of the start-up loan had a beneficial effect on the speed of the 
privatisation; app. 22% of the privatised firms used it between 1991 and 1994. The E-credit is 
also considered as an instrument for driving the growth of bank business. 
1.3.7 Privatisation Loan 
 
The privatisation loan had analogues conditions to the E-credit, but it was far not as 
successful as the previous one. It enabled private persons to access a loan with a maximum of 
75% of the sale price of the state’s asset. It was also granted by the National Bank of 
Hungary, but as mentioned before, it was used only in limited numbers.70  
Therefore the privatisation loan had only a slight influence on the privatisation process. 
1.3.8 Employee Part-Ownership Program 
 
Another important privatisation technique was the Employee Part-Ownership Program 
(EPOP), which enabled a beneficial possibility for employees of state owned enterprises to 
participate in the privatisation of their own company and to become its owner.71  
 
The ideas of Employee Share Ownership Program (ESOP) had appeared already in many 
countries at the beginning of the 70’s, to which the EPOP in Hungary had many similarities. 
Based on the basic idea of EPOP72, the proprietary affection of the employees to their 
company had a positive effect on the efficiency of the business. Furthermore, in some cases 
the EPOP made it possible to save the company from liquidation.  
 
                                                 
69 Cp. Hungary in the XX. Century; the Privatisation and the Compensation (4). 
70 Cp. Bagner/Kovacs (2004), p. 70. 
71 Cp. Voszka (2005), p 29. 
72 Cp. Hungary in the XX. Century; the Privatisation and the Compensation (4). 
 28
The creation of EPOP had often the main goal in Hungary to hold and secure the workplace 
itself instead of achieving additional revenues. Not only employees, but also managers could 
participate in this program, it was called management buy out.73
 
To illustrate how the EPOP operated, its laws, enforced in 199274, will be analysed.These 
defined, that: 
 
• The EPOP can only be implemented by companies, where the employees are officially 
employed.  
• Every employee had the right to participate, but at least six month of employment was 
needed.  
• There was no limit for buying of company shares, but to establish an EPOP at least 
40% of employee participation was required.  
• The EPOP functioned as an organisation of the municipality, the only goal of its 
establishment was the employee buy out; the organisation only stayed alive till the 
borrowed credit was paid back.  
• Its key document was the constitution article, which was highly variable within its 
legal bounds.  
• The application of every EPOP was considered by the State Property Agency; in case 
of similar applications the one in an EPOP was preferable.  
 
At the beginning of 1993 the state modified the credit conditions; therefore the actual E-credit 
rate was applied. Another advantage was that besides of the initial starting capital no 
mortgage was required to request a credit. Employees could benefit from personal income tax 
allowances as well. We can summarise, that the participation in EPOP involved many 
advantages. This support was part of the government’s conscious economic policy, which 
accounted for the evolution of the society’s ownership scheme with the special focus on the 
development of small investors.75  
 
 
                                                 
73 Cp. Kovács (2002), p. 42. 
74 Cp. Hungary in the XX. Century; the Privatisation and the Compensation (4). 
75 Cp. Bagner/Kovacs (2004), p. 71. 
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1.3.9 Privatisation Leasing  
 
The privatisation leasing had many similarities with the above mentioned Employee Part-
Ownership Program, where state-owned companies and assets were available to rent for 
usage. These assets and companies available of leasing were, because of their lack of demand, 
left out often from the privatisation, but with this method they could be of good use. The 
privatisation leasing was only two years long in force after its creation.76
 
The above listed privatisation techniques had all the main goal to support the privatisation 
process and to enable the formation of small, - middle, - and large domestic enterprises. 
1.3.10 Summary and Future Prospects for the Empirical Part III 
 
The compensation process was theoretically based on the idea of equality, but the practice 
stood in clear contrast; therefore, the secondary ownership emerged. Secondary owners are 
self interest and profit driven individuals aiming to “trick” the privatisation process, in order 
to benefit from others’ expense.  
 
The wide acceptance of compensation vouchers allowed entitled persons to use them as an 
exchange for company shares. The introduction of the vouchers influenced the performance of 
companies in a beneficial way; many became listed on the stock market. 
 
Municipalities, as state bodies, became majority owners of large companies. 
 
From my point of view it is important to emphasise the extensive support of this period for 
domestic investors; it was especially beneficial for the country and many of the small- and 
medium sized enterprises were efficiently privatised. 
The privatisation programs (e.g. start-up loan, Employee part ownership program) assisted the 
above mentioned process as well. 
 
                                                 
76 Cp. Bagner/Kovacs (2004), p. 71. 
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1.4 The Privatisation Process between 1994 and 1998 
1.4.1 The New Government 
 
After the first four official years of the privatisation, a significant change happened within the 
privatisation process; the new government led by the Prime Minister Gyula Horn, introduced 
contrary and restrictive policies, which set back the previous direction of the privatisation.  
 
The new government criticized strongly the previous government’s program; it took a stand 
especially against the lack of parliamentary control and required publicity, against the speed 
of the privatisation, its institutions and regulations. They considered the economic growth 
started in 1993 unrealistic77 and set restrictive policies, like;  
 
• No ministry was appointed to lead the privatisation; this role was taken over by the 
Minister of Finance. 
• Just a very few new applications were announced, the privatisation was stagnated, 
essentially only the ongoing 165 privatisation transactions were continued.78 
• Politics of dismissal (well-known arrangements of the socialism) was used; more than 
a hundred of managing directors and nearly a thousand of managerial and board 
members of SOEs were laid off and replaced79 
 
In 1994 it went that far, that the prime minister himself encroached in the privatisation 
process (see the case with Hungarhotels)80. He qualified the decision of the State Property 
Agency as wrong, and he made pressure on its repeal. This scandalous action had the 
consequence that many foreign investors lost temporarily their investing interest in Hungary.  
 
As mentioned before, starting from 1994, the new government strictly reviewed and audited 
the privatisation program of the previous government, but no illegal privatisation operations 
were found.81 There were just a very few objectionable acts on behalf of the board of 
directors, but considering the thousands of transactions it was still not a bad result.  
 
                                                 
77 Cp. Hungary in the XX. Century; the Privatisation and the Compensation (5). 
78 Cp. Hungary in the XX. Century; the Privatisation and the Compensation (5). 
79 Cp. Bagner/Kovacs (2004), p. 33-34. 
80 Cp. Hungary in the XX. Century; the Privatisation and the Compensation (5). 
81 Cp. Hungary in the XX. Century; the Privatisation and the Compensation (5). 
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In the middle of 1995 a new privatisation law was announced, which merged the State 
Property Agency with the Hungarian State Holding Company, and so the Hungarian 
Privatisation and State Holding Co. (ÁPV Rt.) was established.82 Furthermore, the reduction 
of the economic role of the state and at the same time the incense of state revenues were 
identified as new goals of the privatisation. 83 The company was in sole ownership of the 
state; its tasks included the management of privatisation and the supervision of companies 
being held in long-term state ownership. The consolidated company employed that time app. 
450 employees.  
 
Another new regulation of the 1995 privatisation law was the so called “simplified 
privatisation”. This could be resorted only by executive officers, and only if the company had 
less than 500 employees and 600 million HUF of capital resources.84  According to this law, 
the companies had to prepare alone for the privatisation, the State Privatisation and Asset 
Management Company was responsible only for the final decision. The simplified 
privatisation underwent three phases, where app. 140 companies were sold. The goal of the 
program was also to fasten the privatisation process, which was planned to be finished by the 
end of 1996.85 This plan could not be realised, because it made the privatisation only more 
bureaucratic and slow. These thoughts will be analysed in greater detail in the next chapter of 
Recent Years. 
1.4.2 Results of the New Way of Privatisation 
 
In interest of the new government, the previous beneficial and subsidiary policies were 
repealed; since the highest amount available for Start-up loan was limited to 50 million HUF 
or maximal to the half of the company’s selling price, the acceptance of the compensation 
warrants and the possibilities of domestic investors to acquire new ownerships were also 
widely restricted86.  
 
Because of these changed circumstances, the new government privatised within its 
administration app. 1070 billion HUF87 of state assets, what was nearly two and a half times 
                                                 
82 Cp. Hungarian Privatisation and State Holding Company (1). 
83 Cp. Bagner/Kovacs (2004), p. 48. 
84 Cp. Hungary in the XX. Century; the Privatisation and the Compensation (5). 
85 Cp. Sárközi (2005), p. 11. 
86 Cp. Bagner/Kovacs (2004), p. 27. 
87 Cp. Hungarian Privatisation and State Holding Company (2). 
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more, than what the previous government achieved. An example for the speed of privatisation 
is that more than half of the state’s entrepreneurial assets were already privatised by the end 
of 1996.88 It is important to mention, that the ratio of domestic and foreign investors was 
significantly changed. Its position of 45%-55% achieved by the previous government was 
modified to 85%89 in favour of the foreign investors. In 1995 the privatisation revenues 
reached the highest yearly number till then, 481 billion HUF flew in, 80% of it was in cash 
and almost only from foreign investors.90  
 
This period was characterised also by the selling of majority ownership and management 
rights of large service companies. The Hungarian Oil & Gas Company Plc (MOL Rt.)91, with 
its large share of the Hungarian oil market, was sold at a very low price (its share price went 
up in two years by 400%); the five regional gas service companies became foreign-owned and 
also six other electric power companies were sold. It came to the second major selling of the 
Hungarian Telecommunications Company Ltd. (MATÁV Rt.)92, and other sales occurred in 
the chemicals and pharmaceutical industry.  
 
There were some scandalous cases in the bank industry; among others the privatisation of 
Budapest Bank Rt. became questionable. In contrast to its previous consolidation and 
extensive capital support, it was sold massively under priced and it became foreign-owned 
with almost no remuneration.93
1.4.3 Talking Numbers and the Critics 
 
The article of Liska (2005)94 investigates critically the privatisation process with the focus of 
the selling of strategically important Hungarian enterprises. He contrasted the numbers of the 
annual privatisation incomes with the annual privatisation expenses in the following Table 2: 
 
 
 
                                                 
88 Cp. Bagner/Kovacs (2004), p. 37. 
89 Cp. Hungary in the XX. Century; the Privatisation and the Compensation (5). 
90 Cp. Hungarian Privatisation and State Holding Company (2). 
91 Cp. Hungarian Oil & Gas Company Plc (MOL Rt.). 
92 Cp. Matáv Hungarian Telecommunications Company Ltd. 
93 Cp. Hungary in the XX. Century; the Privatisation and the Compensation (5). 
94 Cp. Liska (2005), p. 230-248. 
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Year 
Privatisation Inflows 
(in million HUF) 
Privatisation Expenses 
(in million HUF) 
1990 670 0 
1991 31 360 3 430 
1992 77 230 24 940 
1993 169 910 58 300 
1994 156 670 46 340 
1995 473 965 241 938 
1996 157 964 340 168 
1997 349 753 329 509 
1998 111 923 150 439 
1999 132 395 132 392 
2000 56 987 60 121 
 
   Table 2: Comparison of Privatisation Inflows and Expenses 
   Source: Liska (2005), p. 233, Hungarian Privatisation and State Holding Company (2). 
 
The table summarises well, that in the beginnings (after the changing of the regime), 
transactions were of lower value, and the revenues were clearly higher than the expenditures. 
In this time generally the well-operating small or middle sized enterprises were sold 
domestically in favour of domestic investors. After the state privatised these firms, the 
privatisation continued with the selling of large strategic Hungarian companies.95 This time, 
mainly between 1994 and 1996, the main goal of the state was to increase state revenues, 
therefore these firms were sold regardless of their financial situation.  
 
The data of the previous table shows clearly, that this goal was not realised, because the high 
incomes were also combined with high expenses. In 1996 it went also that far, that the yearly 
expenses exceeded the inflows. 
 
Lentner (1997) summarised in his notes these happenings as a “key mistake of the 
governments”, that they should have realised earlier that selling of strategically important 
firms was not the right way to reduce state debts, and in the final balance it only led to high 
expenses and wasted chances.96  
                                                 
95 Cp. Voszka (2005), p. 28. 
96 Cp. Lentner (1997), p. 36. 
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 Another explanation for the low balance of the privatisation revenues was that because the 
state urgently needed inflows to refinance its short-term credits, it did not have the time for 
sufficient price negotiations. The case of Kaposvári Húskombinát, a large agricultural factory, 
states a good example, where the company-intern continuous maintenance work was stopped, 
because the management was afraid of not being able to sell fast the valuable and technically 
well-equipped company. The not repaired machinery equipments resulted in value losses, so 
at the end the company could be offered on a lower selling price. Finally the factory was 
bought up for 4.4 billion HUF by Italian investors, the expenses reached almost 4 billion 
HUF, leaving the state, compared to the inflows, with a small amount of revenues.97  
1.4.4 The Opposition 
 
The number of the opposition grew fast and the State Audit Office doubted the success of the 
“new way” of the operations as well. As an example the privatisation of the electric power 
companies was also not professionally prepared, and furthermore the selling of management 
rights to foreigners was also considered as an elementary failure of the national economy.  
Many from the opposition stated, that the government was not prepared for the large 
privatisation inflows, because it did not have an appropriate investment plan for its optimal 
utilisation; so the excess revenues were used mostly only to redeem public debt.98  
1.4.5 Tocsik-Scandal 
 
Probably one of the biggest privatisation scandals was associated with Marta Tocsik’s name, 
which was based on the litigation between municipalities and the state. It included in more 
detail, that in the meaning of the privatisation law of 1989, the value of the internal grounds 
stated in the balance sheet of privatised companies did not belong to the state, but it pertained 
to the municipality where the companies were located.99  
 
The problem was based on the false interpretation of the law. In the previous years, instead of 
the whole value of the inbound grounds listed on the company’s balance sheet, only its 
reduced value, lowered proportionately by the liabilities, was paid to the municipalities. This 
                                                 
97 Cp. Liska (2005), p. 232. 
98 Cp. Gidai (1996), p. 13. 
99 Cp. Bagner/Kovacs (2004), p. 26. 
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issue went on trial in 1996, where based on the final decision of the Supreme Court, the state 
had to compensate retroactively all the losses of municipalities. Because the sum of these 
obligations had a high approximate value of 80 billion HUF, the lawyer Marta Tocsik was 
requested to reduce this amount.100 Her activities were supported by the establishment of two 
limited liability companies, which were founded in order to compromise with municipalities 
to pay a lower compensation.101   
 
When this came to light, a big scandal emerged about the usage of state power bargaining 
about its duties. It was also contrary to the rules, that Marta Tocsik was given for her work an 
especially high success fee of 800 million HUF.102 A criminal procedure started immediately 
against the lawyer, the involved executive officers of the State Privatisation and Asset 
Management Company (ÁPV Rt.) and other possible participants.  
1.4.6 Evaluation of this Period 
 
The politics of the new cabinet was characterised by accelerating the privatisation process and 
increasing the foreign ownership in the country. Many of the subsidies were taken away from 
domestic investors, while the state made use of the privatisation in order to increase its 
revenues. The quality of professional control of the privatisation and its popularity greatly 
decreased, while the necessary parliamentary audit could not be achieved. The privatisation 
process was characterised by secrecy and by the importance of personal connections.  
 
Therefore, and for the reasons stated in previous parts, the Hungarian privatisation process 
was judged negative by most of the public.103  
 
There were made many mistakes indeed, but I need to complement that the origins of many 
privatisation problems were based also on the difficulty, that no appropriate literature had 
been available about the “right way” of the privatisation. Nobody had analyzed transition 
economies effectively before, and not even the way how they could have transferred 
efficiently from socialism to a market economy. The situation became also complicated 
because of continuous fights between opposite interest groups and political powers to acquire 
                                                 
100 Cp. Hungary in the XX. Century; the Privatisation and the Compensation (5). 
101 Cp. Bagner/Kovacs (2004), p. 26. 
102 Cp. Hungary in the XX. Century; the Privatisation and the Compensation (5). 
103 Cp. Bagner/Kovacs (2004), p. 19.  
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assets as cheap as possible. It was obvious as well that everyone’s interest could not be met at 
the same time, and it was in interest of the governments in power to magnify the mistakes of 
previous cabinets.  
 
Despite all these, the outside world considered the Hungarian privatisation between 1989 and 
1998 generally as successful, and even many Hungarian specialists agreed with that. In these 
years, the economic structure was completely transformed, foreign capital investments 
increased to 16 billion USD, the HUF became stable and the Hungarian economy developed 
as well. 
1.4.7 Summary and Future Prospects for the Empirical Part IV 
 
A new way of privatisation was introduced, which was characterised by contrary and 
restrictive policies.  
 
Additional privatisation laws were enforced in 1995; the newly established Hungarian 
Privatisation and State Holding Company became the legal successor of the state privatisation 
funds.  
 
Within these and the next years, most of the largest Hungarian companies were privatised, 
and many changes occurred in their ultimate ownership types. In the final part of my diploma 
I investigate the determinants of these changes. 
 
In my opinion, this was the period when the government began to overstate the support for 
foreign investors at the expense of domestic ones. The privatisation regulations favoured 
foreign investors (e.g. Gedeon Richter Plc …) through state subsidiaries and tax allowances in 
order to attract even more foreign capital. Foreign ownership became dominant in Hungary in 
these four years; it increased from its overall ratio of 45% to 85%. 
The described period is characterised by the selling of majority ownership rights of 
strategically important companies; to these belong among others the Hungarian Oil & Gas 
Company Plc., Matáv Hungarian Telecommunications Company Ltd., five regional gas 
service companies and six electric power companies. 
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The Hungarian ownership structure became more concentrated and the changed regulations of 
the privatisation resulted in the development of large-scale investors, who disposed of a 
significant power and influence within the European market. 
 
1.5 The Privatisation from 1998 till the Recent Years 
1.5.1 Recent Years 
 
The Hungarian privatisation process seemed to come to end at the first time in 1996104, but in 
reality it is still present. However, what we can be sure about, that its importance decreased 
from the turning of the millennium, when the original number of nearly 2000 SOEs in the 
possession of state asset management companies decreased to app. 10%.105  
 
Karsai (2005) investigated these and other changes effected by the privatisation from the early 
90’s within the Hungarian economy. He states in his writings, that there is a privatisation 
trend driving changes in the ownership structure of Hungarian companies. The most important 
characteristic of this trend is its cyclicality106, which is related on the one hand to the world 
economy, and on the other hand to the internal politics.  
 
Bagner/Kovacs (2004) writes also about this cyclicality, their article emphasizes its effects on 
internal political actions. Before political elections, the privatisation process always slows 
down, so the government can concentrate solely on the acquisition or retention of the political 
power. After the election it always speeds up in order to increase revenues and to demonstrate 
again the commitment of the new government.107
 
Voszka (2005) answers the question “Why does the privatisation process last for such a long-
term?” in her critical article with the outspoken and hidden motives of the state. These are:108  
 
• enforcement of the public interest 
• theory of market failure 
                                                 
104 Cp. Voszka (2005), p. 15. 
105 Cp. Belyo (2005), p. 100. 
106 Cp. Karsai (2005), p. 47. 
107 Cp. Bagner/Kovacs (2004), p. 30. 
108 Cp. Voszka (2005), p. 19-20. 
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• argument of redistribution 
• position power and influence 
 
The first two are the “good” factors of the privatisation; the enforcement of the public interest 
is based on the assumption that the state has almost all the information available to decide in 
favour of the general interest, while the theory of the market failure allows the presence of 
state ownership only in market situations, where competition could not work because of 
potential monopolies. 
 
The other two reasons are based on their “abuse of power” nature hidden for the public; 
according to the argument of redistribution the privatisation “redistributes” benefits and 
burdens of special classes automatically109, but this initially “automatic” process can be used 
to satisfy political interests as well. An example can be the avoidance of public budget 
debates with the allocation of state subsidiaries. The fourth reason, position power and 
influence, is interlocked with the previous one, which is the redistribution of public properties 
to gain power and political influence, This can easily lead to illegal enrichment of people 
being in leading positions.110 Today’s political debates about the ending of the privatisation 
do not include the latter two arguments, but many believe111 that they play a key role. 
 
It is also important to remark, that no new privatisation law was created officially with the 
acceptance of the ministry since 1998; however the privatisation practice in these years was 
quite distinct.112 This observation refers back to the statement of Bagner/Kovacs (2004) and 
Karsai (2005) that a clear distinction is needed between principles and practice of Hungarian 
privatisation policies.  
They have justified their statement with the following two reasons:  
 
Firstly, many processes were executed without any parliamentary legislation, because so 
called “silent”113 adjustments or modifications were used by the changing governments. These 
adjustments were characteristic for the period between 1994 and 1998 under the socialist 
government, when the Kupa-program and the Bokros-package was introduced without any 
                                                 
109 (e.g. motorways in state hands, where, in case of centrally financed tariff cuttings, everyone has the burden of 
tax paying but only the ones who actually use the roads do benefit). 
110 Cp. Voszka (2005), p. 20. 
111 Cp. Voszka (2005), Karsai (2005), Bagner/Kovacs (2004). 
112 Cp. Karsai (2005), p. 48. 
113 Cp. Karsai (2005), Bagner/Kovacs (2004). 
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parliamentary supervision. Then the next government, led by Viktor Orbán, made also silent 
modifications in 1999, which allowed the cabinet to make uncontrolled arrangements in the 
budget line of 2001-2002. Years later this strategy was continued by the next socialist 
government, led by Péter Medgyessy, as well.114
Secondly, the contradiction between existing and newly established laws, legislated by the 
series of governments, led to disorientation, which allowed a wide political leeway for the 
interpretation of privatisation processes.115  
 
Another remarkable characteristic of these years is the Hungarian welfare issue. It is 
important to notice that series of governments were trying to sustain the original welfare 
system, instead of modifying the public finance reform. As a consequence, large amounts 
were spent followed by increasing public debt, but the outdated welfare system still could not 
satisfy the expectations.116  
1.5.2 Summary of the Hungarian Privatisation 
 
In spite of the previously listed real or putative mistakes of the privatisation the reverse of the 
medal still shows positive achievements. Belyó (2005) has identified that one of the indicators 
for its efficiency is the companies’ profitability index. His study gives a favourable picture 
about the financial situation of the privatised and foreign owned companies. It shows a 
tendency that starting from the end of the 90’s the average annual revenues of the privatised 
companies rose often by 50%, while the state owned ones had to suffer significant losses.117 
Of course these results are not only due to the presence of foreign owners, but they depend on 
their actions; e.g. share capital increases and technology modernizations.  
 
I want to close this topic with the illustration of a summary figure (see Figure 2) of all the 
notable events occurred in the last 17 years of the privatisation. 
                                                 
114 Cp. Karsai (2005), p. 48. 
115 Cp. Karsai (2005), p. 49. 
116 Cp. Bagner/Kovacs (2004), p. 28. 
117 Cp. Belyo (2005), p. 101. 
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Figure 2: Data on Enterprises, Companies as of 30th June 2007 
Source: Hungarian Privatisation and State Holding Company (1). 
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2 Impacts of the Privatisation on the 50 Largest Hungarian Companies 
 
2.1 Introduction and Expectations 
 
The empirical part of my thesis is based on an evaluation of the 50 largest Hungarian 
enterprises. 
 
The “largest companies” were determined by the size of their total assets in 1995. In this 
study, I investigate the companies in the years 1995 and 2003. I defined 75 variables and 
collected 100 observations in total (of the 50 companies in the two periods), where I focus 
especially on the ownership structure and on the types of ultimate shareholders of the largest 
companies. The aim of this part is to find the determinants of ultimate domestic ownership 
and the determinants of changes in the number and types of ultimate shareholders. 
Based on the previous theoretical chapter “The Hungarian Privatisation” I formulated three 
expectations: 
 
• Expectation (1): Domestic ultimate ownership is combined with low company 
profitability and small company size in Hungary.  
• Expectation (2): A larger deviation of cash flow from control rights leads to less 
change in the ultimate shareholder type. 
• Expectation (3): Changes in ultimate ownership are due to the decreased role of state 
as an ultimate shareholder. 
 
As stated above, my expectations are based on the history of the Hungarian privatisation 
process but especially on the literature by Voszka (2005) Belyo (2005) and Karsai (2005).  
Voszka (2005)118 presents two main characteristics of the Hungarian ownership structure; one 
is the high percentage of foreign ownership rights and the other is the concentrated ownership 
structure. She emphasized a risk factor combined with the appearance of large scale foreign 
investors. On the one hand, large scale investors bring the capital, technology and markets for 
the companies in their ownership, but on the other hand, frequently, these companies 
represent the lowest hierarchy level of large multinational companies, which often merely 
                                                 
118 Cp. Voszka (2005), p. 31-38. 
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satisfies production purposes of large parent companies. The influential foreign large scale 
investors aim to control their subsidiary companies through concentrated ownership 
structures. 
As an indicator for the efficiency of the privatisation process, Belyó (2005) identified the 
companies’ profitability index. His study gives a favourable picture of the financial situation 
of the privatised and foreign owned companies. It shows that, starting from the end of the 
90’s, the average annual revenues of the privatised companies often increased by 50%, while 
the state owned ones had to suffer significant losses.119 Hungarian ownership is characterised 
by concentrated ownership structures (due to large scale investors) and foreign ownership. 
 
To test my expectation (1), I chose the variables total assets and sales per employees. In order 
to test expectation (2), I created, among others the variables, shareholder direct, cash flow 
rights of ultimate shareholders and cash flow rights per voting rights. Finally, to test 
expectation (3) I used the variables ultimate shareholder type “state” and the dummy variable 
Hungarian state01. I explain these and other major variables in Section 2. 
 
The empirical study is organised as follows. Section 2 provides a description of the data, 
which includes the variables and summary tables. Furthermore it provides a list of company 
forms, a description of the 50 largest companies and the limitations of my study. Section 3 
presents the main logistic regression results, while Section 4 provides a conclusion. 
 
2.2 The Data 
 
To gather the required data, I used the database AMADEUS as a main source. Afterwards, I 
completed and audited my data by using internet research, the classification scheme of the 
World Bank and Fay (1996). I used the software package Microsoft Office Excel to 
summarise my data and subsequently transferred it to the statistical software Stata_9120, which 
I used for the final data analysis and testing. 
 
 
                                                 
119 Cp. Belyo (2005), p. 101. 
120 Stata: Data Analysis and Statistical Software. 
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2.2.1 Variables and Summary Tables 
2.2.1.1 Description of the Variables 
 
As stated above, I focus especially on the ownership structure and on the type of ultimate 
shareholders within the investigation of the 50 largest Hungarian companies. Taking the 
ownership structure of North-Hungarian Electricity Supply Co. Ltd. (see Figure 3) as an 
example, I describe four of the most important variables in further detail. 
 
 
          Figure 3: Ownership Structure of the North-Hungarian Electricity Supply Co. Ltd. 
 
North-Hungarian Electricity Supply Co. Ltd. is an electricity supply company. It is Nr. 15 in 
the ranking of the 50 largest Hungarian companies. In my study, I will refer to it as a base 
layer company, since it represents the “base” of ownership layers. RWE AG. is located at the 
first layer of the pyramid. It is the largest direct shareholder with its 49% ownership in the 
Hungarian company (see variable shareholder direct). The Republic of Germany is the largest 
ultimate shareholder, it holds 56.8% direct ownership in RWE AG, and by this belongs to the 
second (ownership) layer.  
 
In order to measure the ownership rights of the German state (ultimate layer) in the North-
Hungarian Electricity Supply Co. Ltd. (base layer), I created the variable cash flow rights of 
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ultimate shareholders. In the previous example, it represents 27.83%, which is quantified by 
multiplying the ownership rights of the largest direct shareholders (49% and 56.8%). As a 
measure of control, I created the variable cash flow rights per voting rights, which represents 
the ratio of cash flow rights of ultimate shareholders (=27.83%) divided by the voting rights 
(=49%, equals shareholder direct). This example has two pyramid layers (see variable 
number of pyramid layers) with RWE AG. and the Republic of Germany as the largest 
shareholders. 
The example is simple but representative of all the other company records. 
 
I sort the most important variables of my study into four groups: 
 
• Performance Measures: I introduce each company with performance related variables. 
I use the variables total assets and sales as measure of size, sales per employees and 
profits and losses after tax per total assets for measuring profitability. In the second 
period, I only managed to find values for the variable profits and losses after tax only 
in limited numbers. I state this and further constraints of my study in greater detail in a 
later part of Limitations of the Analysis. 
 
• First Layer: the most representative variables are: shareholder direct (=shareholders 
with the largest direct ownership), shareholder type (=industry type of the 
shareholders in the first layer, e.g.: family, industrial company, other financial 
institution, privatisation fund or state), shareholder country (=states the nationality of 
the largest shareholder), domestic shareholder01 (=variable of binary choice; “1” 
stands for domestic ownership, “0” for foreign ownership) and quoted01 (=explains 
whether the company is listed on the stock exchange, “1” stands for yes). 
 
• Ultimate Layer: it consists of ultimate shareholder type, ultimate shareholder country, 
and domestic ultimate shareholder01. The variables cash flow rights of ultimate 
shareholders and cash flow rights per voting rights are described in Figure 3. 
Change01 is a binary variable; it explains whether or not there was a change in the 
type of ultimate ownership. I created two other variables of private domestic 
ownership01, where in case of the second one I dropped the observations of the 
Hungarian “state” as the ultimate owner to find the determinants of domestic and 
private domestic ownership. 
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 • Pyramid Layer: illustrates the number of pyramid layers; the number of (ownership) 
layers of the largest direct shareholders. The number of the layers ranged from 1 to 7 
in my study. Pyramid layer01, as a variable of binary choice, differentiates companies 
with only one layer (value=0) and companies with more than one layers (value=1). 
2.2.1.2 Summary Tables 
 
Performance Measures 
 
I identify three main variables to measure the performance of the companies under 
assessment; these are the total assets, sales per employees and profits and losses after tax per 
total assets. Total assets are measured in million USD. 
 
Variable: Total Assets 
Period Observations Mean Median 
1 50 1617.9588 559.28964 
2 48 569.2906 253.11538 
Total 98 1104.3254 390.13419 
 
             Table 3: Summary Table of the Variable Total Assets 
 
The variable total assets (see Table 3) measures the size of the company, it consists of the 
fixed assets (=intangible-, tangible- and other assets), the current assets (=stock, debtor and 
other) and cash & cash equivalents. As mentioned before, the two periods are comparable due 
to the adjustment performed according to changes in the Consumer Price Index. 
 
The result shows that the mean of the total assets decreased significantly, from the first to the 
second period. Its’ value shifted from around 1618 million USD to 569 million USD. This 
difference might arise from changes in the fields of operations, since many among them lost 
the market positions held in the first period. This implies that a determination of the 50 largest 
companies in the second period would have probably led to an even higher mean of total 
assets. The remarkably small value of the medians compared to the value of the means in both 
of the periods is due to the skewness in firm size within the observed values. 
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Variable: Sales per Employees 
Period Observations Mean Median 
1 49 .30037393 .06209386 
2 46 .4784912 .16994202 
Total 95 .38662018 .09463492 
 
             Table 4: Summary Table of the Variable Sales per Employees 
 
The variable sales per employees measures the profitability of the companies (see Table 4); it 
derives from the ratio of company sales divided by the number of their employees.  
The mean of the variable is increasing; it rose from around 300 thousand USD per employee 
to nearly 478 thousand USD from one sampling period to the other.  
The small values of the medians in the first and second period (62 thousand USD and 170 
thousand USD per employees) compared to the mean values can be explained by the 
skewness of firm sales. 
 
Variable: Profit and Losses after Tax per Total Assets 
Period Observations Mean Median 
1 2 .03798401 .03798401 
2 47 .03697089 .04057213 
Total 49 .03701224 .04057213 
 
             Table 5: Summary Table of the Variable Profit and Losses after Tax per Total Assets 
 
Profits and losses after tax per total assets (see Table 5) is the primary variable chosen for 
measuring the company’s profitability. Due to missing values of profits and losses after tax in 
the first period, I chose the variable sales per employees instead. For that reason, this variable 
only represents the company’s profitability for the second period. It has a mean value of 
3.7%, where 11 out 49 companies observed suffered losses. 
 
First Layer 
 
The variable shareholder direct represents the ownership right of the largest direct 
shareholder. 
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Variable: Shareholder Direct 
Period Observations Mean Median 
1 50 70.69% 64.5% 
2 45 73.94% 90% 
Total 95 72.23% 73.7% 
 
             Table 6: Summary Table of the Variable Shareholder Direct 
 
The summary table (see Table 6) shows a minor growth in the mean of the ownership rights; 
its average increased from nearly 71% to 74% in the second period. This slight increase 
represents a more concentrated ownership structure; I expect an interrelation to the formation 
of large-scale investors as stated in the theoretical part of the privatisation. 
 
I display the results of the variable shareholder type in Table 7: 
 
Period 1 - Variable: Shareholder Type 
Shareholder Type Frequency Percent 
INDUSTRIAL COMPANY 31 62% 
PRIVATISATION FUND 16 32% 
OTHER FINANCIAL INSTITUTION 2 4% 
STATE 1 2% 
Total 50 100% 
Period 2 - Variable: Shareholder Type 
Shareholder Type Frequency Percent 
INDUSTRIAL COMPANY 37 77.08% 
PRIVATISATION FUND 6 12.50% 
OTHER FINANCIAL INSTITUTION 3 6.25% 
LIQUIDATION 1 2.08% 
STATE 1 2.08% 
Total 48 100.00% 
 
     Table 7: Summary Table of the Variable Shareholder Type 
 
Shareholder type categories are “industrial company”, “privatisation fund”, “other financial 
institution” and “state” as the largest direct shareholder. It is interesting to observe the 
reduced impact of privatisation funds over the two periods; the first period’s value of 32% 
decreased to 12.5% until the second period. The number of privatisation funds decreased 
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significantly (from 16 to 6), while the number of industrial companies and other financial 
institutions increased.  
 
The overall lack of financial institutions as largest shareholders or as largest companies 
especially in the first period is demonstrated in the previous chapter called The Hungarian 
Privatisation. This chapter explains the week position of Hungarian banks and financial 
institutions and their necessity for continuous consolidations.  
 
Variable: Shareholder Country 
Shareholder Country Period 1 Period 2 Total 
HU 30 24 54 
DE 4 7 11 
US 4 3 7 
FR 3 4 7 
AT 3 2 5 
NL 2 2 4 
BE 1 1 2 
SE 1 1 2 
LI 0 1 1 
LU 0 1 1 
NO 0 1 1 
RO 1 0 1 
OTHER FOREIGN 1 0 1 
Total 50 47 97 
 
Table 8: Summary Table of the Variable Shareholder Country 
 
The previous table (see Table 8) of the variable shareholder country shows a clearly 
decreasing tendency of the largest Hungarian shareholders on the one side, while showing an 
increase in the number of foreign companies on the other side (especially in the case of 
Germany).  
Germany, USA, France and Austria play a major role in the ownership of the 50 largest 
Hungarian companies as foreign owners. 
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Period 1 - Variable: Domestic Shareholder01 
Domestic Shareholder01 Frequency Percent 
0 - foreign ownership 20 40% 
1 - domestic ownership 30 60% 
Total 50 100% 
Period 2 - Variable: Domestic Shareholder01 
Domestic Shareholder01 Frequency Percent 
0 - foreign ownership 23 48.94% 
1 - domestic ownership 24 51.06% 
Total 47 100% 
 
     Table 9: Summary Table of the Variable Domestic Shareholder01 
 
I created the variable domestic shareholder01 (see Table 9) to be able to test direct domestic 
ownership by using LOGIT regression functions. The data summarises the result of the 
previous variable shareholder country. It is a variable of binary choice, displaying the value 
of “1”, if the largest shareholder is a domestic owner, otherwise, in the case that the largest 
direct shareholder is a foreign owner, it has a value of ‘0’. 
 
Ultimate Layer 
 
The results of the variable cash flow rights of ultimate shareholders (defined previously in 
Figure 3) are summarised in Table 10: 
 
Variable: Cash Flow Rights of Ultimate Shareholder 
Period Observations Mean Median 
1 50 61.81% 52.5% 
2 45 48.60% 41.58% 
Total 95 55.55% 50% 
 
             Table 10: Summary Table of the Variable Cash Flow Rights of Ultimate Shareholders 
 
It has a mean of app. 62% for 1995, and an app. value of 49% for 2003. The mean of this 
variable has a decreasing tendency, but the average value of 49% still indicates a distinctive 
attribute for the concentration of Hungarian ownership structure. 
 
 50
The variable ultimate shareholder type has many similarities with the variable shareholder 
type; the only difference is that while the first one represents the ultimate layer of the 
pyramid, the latter stands for the first largest shareholder with direct ownership rights. There 
are cases where these two variables have the same result; this is the case when a company has 
only one pyramid layer in its ownership structure. I summarised the results in Table 11: 
 
Period 1 - Variable: Ultimate Shareholder Type 
Ultimate Shareholder Type Frequency Percent 
STATE 24 48.00% 
INDUSTRIAL COMPANY 12 24.00% 
FAMILY 5 10.00% 
FOREIGN STATE 4 8.00% 
OTHER FINANCIAL INSTITUTION 3 6.00% 
FREEFLOAT 2 4.00% 
Total 50 100.00% 
Period 2 - Variable: Ultimate Shareholder Type 
Ultimate Shareholder Type Frequency Percent 
STATE 15 31.91% 
INDUSTRIAL COMPANY 10 21.28% 
OTHER FINANCIAL INSTITUTION 8 17.02% 
FOREIGN STATE 7 14.89% 
FAMILY 5 10.64% 
FREEFLOAT 2 4.26% 
Total 47 100.00% 
 
    Table 11: Summary Table of the Variable Ultimate Shareholder Type 
 
Due to missing data, I was not able to attribute all the companies to an ultimate shareholder 
type; I refer to these observations as “industrial company”. The Hungarian state as an ultimate 
owner has a decreasing tendency; it has lowered from 48% in the first period to nearly 32% in 
the second period. This result is in line with what one can expect as result of privatisation. 
Foreign ownership has increased over the years; especially foreign state ownership (German, 
French and Austrian), which nearly doubled from 8% to 15%. The increasing number of 
financial institutions is clearly observable as well; it rose from 3 to 8 observations. I believe, 
this result is in relationship to the slow but continuous development of the Hungarian 
banking system and the financial sector.  
 51
 Variable: Ultimate Shareholder Country 
Shareholder Country Period 1 Period 2 Total 
HU 30 20 50 
DE 2 9 11 
US 6 4 10 
FR 3 5 8 
AT 4 2 6 
IT 1 2 3 
BE 1 1 2 
SE 1 1 2 
LI 0 1 1 
LU 0 1 1 
NL 1 0 1 
NO 0 1 1 
OTHER FOREIGN 1 0 1 
Total 50 47 97 
 
Table 12: Summary Table of the Variable Ultimate Shareholder Country 
 
The variable ultimate shareholder country (see Table 12) lists the nationalities of the largest 
ultimate shareholders. After having observed the results of the previous variables, it is not 
surprising to see the decreasing tendency of domestic owners, its ratio of 60% lowered to app. 
43%.  
 
There is a similarity between these results and the results of the variable shareholder country; 
both have an increasing tendency of the German state as the owner of Hungarian firms. 
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Period 1 - Variable: Domestic Ultimate Shareholder01 
Domestic Ultimate Shareholder01 Frequency Percent 
0 - foreign ultimate ownership 20 40% 
1 - domestic ultimate ownership 30 60% 
Total 50 100% 
Period 1 - Variable: Domestic Ultimate Shareholder01 
Domestic Ultimate Shareholder01 Frequency Percent 
0 - foreign ultimate ownership 27 57.45% 
1 - domestic ultimate ownership 20 42.55% 
Total 47 100% 
 
     Table 13: Summary Table of the Variable Domestic Ultimate Shareholder01 
 
The variable domestic ultimate shareholder01 (see Table 13) emphasises the findings as 
described above, (“1” stands for domestic ultimate shareholder, while foreign ultimate 
shareholder is denominated by “0”), but this variable of binary choice has a more important 
role in the following section of Logistic Regression Results. 
 
Variable: Cash Flow Rights Per Voting Rights 
Period Observations Mean Median 
1 50 88.56% 100% 
2 44 67.80% 99% 
Total 94 78.84% 100% 
 
             Table 14: Summary Table of the Variable Cash Flow Rights Voting Rights 
 
The variable cash flow rights per voting rights (explained in Figure 3) represents the 
relationship of two previously described variables; the ratio of the cash flow rights of ultimate 
shareholders divided by shareholder direct.  
The summary table (see Table 14) shows a decreasing, but still very high, average mean value 
of 89% for the first period, and 66% for the second period. This result is possibly in 
relationship with the increasing number of pyramid layers in the second period. I describe the 
variable pyramid layers in further detail in the following part Pyramid Layer. 
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Variable: Change01 
Change01 Frequency Percent 
0 - no change in ultimate shareholder type 20 42.55% 
1 - change in ultimate shareholder type 27 57.45% 
Total 47 100% 
 
     Table 15: Summary Table of the Variable Change01 
 
Change01 is a variable of binary choice; “1” represents a change in the ultimate shareholder 
type, while “0” indicates that the ultimate shareholder is the same in both periods. The 
majority of companies experienced a change in the type of the ultimate shareholder from one 
period to the other, according to the result of 57% (see Table 15). 
 
Pyramid Layer 
 
I have already referred to the variable number of pyramid layers, which is explained in greater 
detail in Figure 3. 
 
Period 1 - Variable: Number of Pyramid Layers 
Number of Pyramid Layers Frequency Percent 
2 21 42% 
1 18 36% 
3 9 18% 
4 2 4% 
Total 50 100% 
Period 2 - Variable: Number of Pyramid Layers 
Number of Pyramid Layers Frequency Percent 
2 18 38.30% 
3  14 29.79% 
1 11 23.40% 
4 3 6.38% 
7 1 2.13% 
Total 47 100% 
 
    Table 16: Summary Table of the Variable Number of Pyramid Layers 
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The observations of the variable number of pyramid layers (see Table 16) show an increasing 
average number of pyramid layers in the second period; the number of companies having 1 to 
2 ownership layers has decreased and the number of other companies with 3 or more 
ownership layers has increased. 
 
Period 1 - Variable: Pyramid Layer01 
Pyramid Layer01 Frequency Percent 
0 - only one pyramid layer 18 36% 
1 - more than one pyramid layer 32 64% 
Total 50 100% 
Period 2 - Variable: Pyramid Layer01 
Pyramid Layer01 Frequency Percent 
0 - only one pyramid layer 11 23.40% 
1 - more than one pyramid layer 36 76.60% 
Total 47 100% 
 
    Table 17: Summary Table of the Variable Pyramid Layer01 
 
Pyramid layer01 (see Table 17) is a variable of binary choice; it is of great importance for the 
logistic regressions performed. Pyramid layer01 distinguishes only two different possible 
conditions; its value equals “0”, if a company has only one pyramid layer, or its value equals 
“1”, if the company has more than one pyramid layer.  
2.2.2 Description of the Company Forms  
 
In the following table (Table 18.) I list the type and number of economic corporations and 
unincorporated enterprises registered in Hungary. This table can be of great help in the further 
investigation of the 50 largest chosen companies. 
 
Permitted 
governance forms 
in the Hungarian 
economy 
Commonly used 
Hungarian 
abbreviation 
Number of units as 
of end-1995 
Number of units as 
of end- 2002 Explanation 
I. According to the 
Companies Act         
Unincorporated 
economic 
associations 
        
-unlimited 
partnership Kt. 3 951 8 113 
More a theoretical 
possibility, than 
reality. 
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-limited partnership Bt. 107 106 208 454 
Very popular form 
of association for 
self-employed and 
family run 
businesses. 
Incorporated 
economic 
associations 
        
-unions - no data no data Exceptional use only. 
-joint enterprises - no data no data Not popular since the early 1990s 
-limited liability 
companies Kft. 102 697 182 242 
Very popular form 
of small- and 
medium size 
businesses. 
-companies limited 
by shares Rt. 3 186 4 425 
Very popular form 
of medium size and 
large businesses. 
II. Permitted and 
regulated by other 
laws 
        
-co-operatives   8 321 6 768 
Typical form of 
rural trading 
companies and 
agricultural 
businesses 
-specialised groups   no data no data Exception 
-water-management 
societies   no data no data 
Typically owned by 
local governments. 
-incorporated work 
teams Gmk. no data no data 
Very popular 
before the changing 
of regime. Later 
most Gmk-s turned 
into Kft.-s. 
 
Permitted 
governance forms 
in the Hungarian 
economy 
Commonly used 
Hungarian 
abbreviation 
Number of units as 
of end-1995 
Number of units as 
of end- 2002 Explanation 
III. Not for profit 
organisations         
-budgetary 
organisations   14 879 15 319 
Owned by the 
central or the local 
governments. 
-compulsory social 
security Tb. 113 82   
-Non-profit 
institutions   46 804 46 804   
Addendum:         
State-owned 
enterprises V. 761 298   
 
   Table 18: Permitted Governance Forms in the Hungarian Economy 
   Source: Bagner/Kovács (2004), Hungarian Central Statistical Office (KSH). 
 
 
 56
The number of enterprise forms based on the Companies Act increased in almost every 
category, the importance of the forms permitted and regulated by other laws decreased, and 
the number of non-profit organisations stayed approximately the same in the two periods.  
 
Limited liability companies (Kft.) and Companies limited by shares (Rt.) as company forms 
play major roles in my research; both of them have noticeable increasing tendencies. The 
number of the latter increased in the period 1995-2002 nearly by 50%, while the number of 
small- and medium enterprises by more than 100%. The number of state owned enterprises 
decreased from 761 to 298, as a result of continuous privatisation transactions of the seven 
years. 
2.2.3 Description of the Companies 
 
I conducted an extensive research,121 in order to acquire as much historical background of the 
analysed companies as possible. I describe each company with typical characteristics and 
individual ranking numbers (based on the size of their total assets). To illustrate them clearly, 
I use the general classification scheme of the World Bank. I divided the companies into five 
main sectors and smaller sub-sectors, they are listed below122: 
 
• Energy, which includes the exploration, extraction, and refinement of oil and natural 
gas. 
• Financial, which includes, real estate, insurance, banks, and other financial services. 
• Infrastructure, which includes transportation, water and sewerage, 
telecommunications, natural gas transmission and distribution, and electricity 
generation, transmission, and distribution. 
• Manufacturing and services, which includes chemicals, construction, steel, hotels, 
tourism, airlines and other sub-sectors that are not infrastructure or finance related. 
• Primary, which includes the extraction, refinement and sale of primary minerals and 
metals such as coal and iron ore. 
 
 
                                                 
121 Cp. Fay (1996). 
122 World Bank (company sectors). 
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2.2.3.1 Energy Sector 
 
The only company belonging to the energy sector is the Nr. 4 Magyar Olaj- és Gázipari Rt. 
(MOL Rt.) / Hungarian Oil & Gas Company Plc. The oil company was founded in 1991, 
and it has a significant role within the Hungarian petroleum industry.123 MOL Rt. was 
privatised in 2004, nowadays it is more than 92.4 %124 foreign owned.  
2.2.3.2 Financial Sector 
 
The Nr. 25 Investor Holding Rt. concentrates its operations mainly on real estates and 
investments. It is the subsidiary company of CP Holding.125
2.2.3.3 Infrastructure Sector 
 
Telecommunication 
 
The Nr. 5 is Magyar Távközlési Rt. / Matáv Hungarian Telecommunications Company 
Ltd., which is the largest telecommunications company in Hungary. It was established in 
1991 and was introduced in the stock market in 1997. Its privatisation underwent many 
stages; it started in 1993 and lasted till 1999. The company was merged and renamed in 2006 
to Magyar Telecom Plc.126  
 
The other telecommunications company with the focus on mobile phone services is the Nr. 31 
Pannon GSM Távközlési Rt. / Pannon GSM Telecommunications Ltd. The company was 
established in 1993 and its business share has grown continuously year by year till the present 
days.127
 
Nr. 41 is Westel Rádiótelefon Kft. / Westel Mobile Telephone Company, which is another 
major player of the telecommunications industry. In 2004 it was renamed into T-Mobile 
Magyarország Távközlési Rt., in 2006 it joined the large international T-Mobile-Group, and it 
                                                 
123 Hungarian Oil & Gas Company Plc. (1). 
124 Hungarian Oil & Gas Company Plc. (2). 
125 Investor Holding Rt. 
126 Matáv Hungarian Telecommunications Company Ltd. 
127 Pannon GSM Telecommunications Ltd. 
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merged into Magyar Telecom Plc (in line with the previously mentioned Nr. 1 Magyar 
Távközlési Rt.).128
 
Antenna Hungária Magyar Műsorszóró és Rádióhírközlési Rt. (Nr. 43) is a TV and Radio 
broadcasting and distribution company. Its shares became listed on the stock exchange in 
1999, and then in 2004 it was privatised. The Swisscom Broadcast AG won the tender, since 
2006 Antenna Hungária is in its 100% ownership.129  
 
Siemens Telefongyár Kft. / Siemens Telephone Factory Ltd. (Nr. 46) was established in 
1991. Siemens is present for 121 years now in Hungary. In 1999 Siemens Telefongyár Kft. 
merged with Siemens Rt and Siemens Investor Kft. into Siemens Nemzeti Vállalat.130
 
Electricity Generation, Transmission, and Distribution (Power Plants) 
 
The Nr. 13 Mátrai Erőmű Rt. / Mátra Power Plant Ltd. began its functions in 1962; today 
it contributes to 13% of the Hungarian electricity supply. It was privatised in 1995, nowadays 
the company is up to 25% owned by the MVM-Group, in the remaining 75% it is foreign 
owned.131
 
The famous Paksi Atomerőmű Rt. / Paks Nuclear Power Plant Ltd. is the Nr. 7, which is 
owned by the Nr. 12 Magyar Villamos Müvek Rt., and therefore it is part of the MVM-Group. 
It is responsible for more than 40% of the Hungarian electricity production.132
 
The Nr. 21 AES Tiszai Erőmű Rt. / AES Tisza II Power Plant Ltd. was founded in 1945, it 
is considered as the biggest power plant in Eastern-Hungary. It was privatised in 1996, when 
it became to 80% foreign-owned by AES (USA).133
 
Vértesi Erőmű Rt. / Vértes Power Plant Co. Ltd. (Nr. 23) is owned by the MVM- Group as 
well, it was created in 1971.134  
                                                 
128 Westel Mobile Telephone Company. 
129 Antenna Hungária Magyar Műsorszóró és Rádióhírközlési Rt. 
130 Siemens Telephone Factory Ltd. 
131 Mátra Power Plant Ltd. 
132 Paks Nuclear Power Plant Ltd. 
133 AES Tisza II Power Plant Ltd. 
134 Vértes Power Plant Co. Ltd. 
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 Bakonyi Erőmű Rt. / Bakony Power Plant Ltd. (Nr. 33) is part of the major Hungarian 
Power Plants as well, it was established in 1943, and its privatisation took place in 1998.135
 
Budapesti Erőmű Rt. (BERT) / Budapest Power Plant Ltd. is the largest Hungarian 
district heating supplier. In 2001 its shares were bought by the Electricité de France 
International S.A. It is the Nr. 26 company.136  
 
Electricity Transmission and Distribution (Power Supply Companies) 
 
The Nr. 16 Dél-magyarországi Áramszolgáltató Rt. (DÉMÁSZ) / South-Hungarian 
Electricity Supply Co. Ltd. was founded in 1951 and belongs to the Hungarian power supply 
companies. It was privatised in 1996, when Électricité de France International S. A. (EDFI) 
acquired the controlling ownership.137  
 
Észak-magyarországi Áramszolgáltató Rt. (ÉMÁSZ) / North-Hungarian Electricity 
Supply Co. Ltd. (Nr. 15) was founded in the same year as the previous company. It was 
privatised in 1995 and became foreign-owned by the German RWE Energie AG, and then its 
shares were introduced to the stock market in 1997.138  
 
The Nr. 11 Észak-dunántúli Áramszolgáltató Rt. / North-West Hungarian Electricity 
Supply Co. Ltd. was founded in 1951; it was privatised in 1995, now it belongs to the large 
E.ON Hungária Group.139  
 
Tiszántúli Áramszolgáltató Rt. / East-Hungarian Electricity Supply Co. Ltd. (Nr. 19) has 
similar history than the above mentioned power supply company, and it belongs to the E.ON 
Hungária Group as well.140
 
The Nr. 22 Dél-dunántúli Áramszolgáltató Rt. / South-West Hungarian Electricity 
Supply Co. Ltd. is a power supply company owned by the E.ON Hungária as well.141  
                                                 
135 Bakony Power Plant Ltd. 
136 Budapest Power Plant Ltd. 
137 South-Hungarian Electricity Supply Co. Ltd. 
138 North-Hungarian Electricity Supply Co. Ltd. 
139 North-West Hungarian Electricity Supply Co. Ltd. 
140 East-Hungarian Electricity Supply Co. Ltd. 
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 Budapesti Elektromos Művek Rt. (ELMÜ) / Budapest Electric Supply Co. Ltd. (Nr. 8) 
has a historical background, which can be traced back for more than 100 years. Its shares 
were introduced in the stock market in 1995, the majority of the company is owned today by 
foreign investors.142  
 
The Nr. 3 is Magyar Villamos Művek Rt. (MVM Rt.) / Hungarian Power Companies 
Ltd. It is the leader of MVM Group and the owner of six regional electricity supplying 
companies and power plants.143  
 
Natural Gas Transmission and Distribution 
 
The Nr. 24 TIGÁZ Tiszántúli Gázszolgáltató Rt. was founded exactly 50 years ago; it 
belongs to the biggest natural gas distributors. The company was privatised in 1995 and was 
bought by the Italian Italgas-SNAM, that way it became a member of the ENI-Group.144
 
Délalföldi Gázszolgáltató Rt. (DÉGÁZ Rt.) / South Hungarian Gas Supply Co. Ltd. (Nr. 
35) was established in 1967. In 1995 the company was privatised and bought by Gaz de 
France International. In 2006 it merged with the North-East Hungarian Gas Supply Co. Ltd., 
and created Égáz-Dégáz Rt.145  
 
The Nr. 42 is Közép-dunántúli Gázszolgáltató Rt. (KÖGÁZ RT.). The company was 
privatised in 1995 as well, it has a historical background for more than 57 years, and it 
belongs to the large E.ON Hungária Group.146  
 
Water and Sewerage 
 
The Nr. 9 Fővárosi Vízművek Rt. / Waterworks of Budapest Ltd. is a water service 
company; it is responsible for the water supply of the capital of Hungary. It has more than 140 
years of company history, today it is owned by the Hungarian City council to 73.6%.147
                                                                                                                                                        
141 South-West Hungarian Electricity Supply Co. Ltd. 
142 Budapest Electric Supply Co. Ltd. (ELMÜ Rt.). 
143 Hungarian Power Companies Ltd. (MVM Rt.) 
144 TIGÁZ Tiszántúli Gázszolgáltató Rt. 
145 South Hungarian Gas Supply Co. Ltd. 
146 Közép-dunántúli Gázszolgáltató Rt. (KÖGÁZ RT.) 
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 Other Infrastructure 
 
Magyar Államvasutak Rt. (MÁV Rt.) / Hungarian State Railways Ltd. (Nr. 2) is a 
railway company, and it was founded in 1846. The company has total railway lines of 7,606 
km, and it is still held in state ownership.148  
 
The Nr. 40 Hungarocamion Nemzetközi Autóközlekedési Rt. was established in 1966, and 
it was an internationally active freight company. In 2002 it was bought by Volán Tefu Rt., and 
the name “Hungarocamion” disappeared in the last years.149  
2.2.3.4 Manufacturing and Services Sector 
 
Chemicals 
 
The Nr. 17 Richter Gedeon Vegyészeti Gyár Rt. / Gedeon Richter Plc. is an international 
pharmaceutical company founded in 1901. Due to privatisation offerings of 1994, 1995 and 
1997 the previous ownership of the Hungarian Privatisation and State Holding Company was 
significantly lowered.150  
 
The Nr. 12 Tiszai Vegyi Kombinát Rt. (TVK Rt.) has a historical background of over 50 
years. TVK is a petrochemical company, with a large market share in Hungary. Its 
privatisation began in 1996, since 2001 it belongs to the MOL-Group (Nr. 4).151  
 
The Nr. 6 Horizon-Multiplan Kutatási és Fejlesztési Rt. / Horizon-Multiplan Research 
and Development Ltd. is an international commercial company in the pharmaceutical 
industry.152 It was founded in 1983 and it was first listed on the Stock Exchange in 1996. In 
2001 the name of the company was changed to Humet Rt.153
 
                                                                                                                                                        
147 Waterworks of Budapest Ltd. 
148 Hungarian State Railways Ltd. (MÁV Rt.). 
149 Hungarocamion Nemzetközi Autóközlekedési Rt. 
150 Gedeon Richter Plc. 
151 Tiszai Vegyi Kombinát Rt. (TVK Rt.). 
152 Horizon-Multiplan Research and Development Ltd. (1). 
153 Horizon-Multiplan Research and Development Ltd. (2). 
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The Nr. 28 EGIS Gyógyszergyár Rt. / EGIS Pharmaceuticals Ltd. is one of the leading 
pharmaceutical companies in Central-Europe. Its privatisation began in 1993; one year later 
the company was introduced in the Stock Exchange. The French company Servier became its 
majority shareholder in 1995, and it managed to keep its control over the last 12 years.154  
 
The legal successor of BorsodChem Rt. / BorsodChem Ltd. (Nr. 32) was founded in 1949. 
The company shares were listed on the Budapest Stock Market in 1996, today it is owned by 
the Austrian CE Oil & Gas Beteiligung und Verwaltung AG.155  
 
The Nr. 29 Chinoin Gyógyszer- és Vegyészeti Termékek Gyára Rt. (Chinoin Rt.) was 
established in 1910. Its privatisation began, compared to other Hungarian enterprises, 
relatively early, in 1989. In 1997 the French company Sanofi acquired 99% of its shares, and 
since 1999 Chinoin Rt. operates as a subsidiary company of Sanofi-Synthélabo.156  
 
The legal successor of Nitrokémia Rt. / Nitrokémie Ltd. (Nr. 47) was established in 1921. 
In order to support its privatisation, in 1997157 the company was split up to Nitrokémia 
Vegyipari Rt. and Nitrokémia 2000 Ipari és Vagyonkezelõ Rt.158
 
Airlines 
 
The Nr. 14 Magyar Légiközlekedési Rt. (MALÉV Rt.) / Hungarian Airlines Ltd. was first 
privatised in 1992, but its shares were bought back by the Hungarian Privatisation and State 
Holding Company five years later.159 Its privatisation ended in 2007 and the company was 
bought by Airbrige Zrt.160
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
154 EGIS Pharmaceuticals Ltd. 
155 BorsodChem Ltd. 
156 Chinoin Gyógyszer- és Vegyészeti Termékek Gyára Rt. 
157 Nitrokémia Rt. (1). 
158 Nitrokémia Rt. (2). 
159 Magyar Légiközlekedési Rt. (MALÉV Rt.) (1). 
160 Magyar Légiközlekedési Rt. (MALÉV Rt.) (2). 
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Steel 
 
The former Nr. 37 DAM-Diósgyöri Acélmüvek Rt. / Diósgyör Steelworks Industrial & 
Trade Shareholding Co. was a steel bar and section producing company. Its story ended due 
to bankruptcy; it was liquidated in 1999.161  
 
Hotels 
 
Danubius Szálloda és Gyógyüdülő Rt. / Danubius Hotel and Spa Ltd. (Nr. 39) was 
established in 1972 and it operates in the hotel and services business. Its shares were 
introduced in the Budapest Stock exchange in 1992 and it was privatised relatively early 
between 1992 and 1994. CP Holding Ltd. has today a controlling ownership over the 
company.162  
 
Construction 
 
The Nr. 1 Opel Magyarország Autóipari Kft. / Opel Hungary Ltd. is present in Hungary 
since 1991; it is a large car manufacturing and distribution company and belongs to the large 
General Motors.163  
 
IKARUS Járműgyártó Rt. / IKARUS Vehicle Manufacturing Co. Ltd. (Nr. 20) is a bus 
manufacturing company with a great business success history (it was the fourth biggest 
manufacturer of the world in the 70s-80s).164 From the middle of the 90s the company started 
having a hard time, the manufacture works were even closed down in 2004. After a break of 
two years it restarted its operations in 2006.165
 
Other 
 
The Nr. 10 Magyar Posta Rt. / Hungarian Post Co. Ltd. has a historical background of 
many hundred years; today it is still in long-term state ownership.166
                                                 
161 DAM-Diósgyöri Acélmüvek Rt. 
162 Danubius Hotel and Spa Ltd. 
163 Opel Magyarország Autóipari Kft. 
164 IKARUS Járműgyártó Rt. (1). 
165 IKARUS Járműgyártó Rt. (2). 
166 Magyar Posta Rt. 
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 The legal successor of Cereol Rt. / Cereol Ltd. (Nr. 27) was founded in 1964, and the 
company is present in the vegetable oil industry. It was privatised in 1994; its present name 
became Bunge Növényolajipari Rt.167  
 
The Nr. 38 Dunapack Papír és Csomagolóanyag Rt. / Dunapack Paper and Packaging 
Ltd. is a Hungarian paper and packaging manufacturer, it has factories in Bulgaria, Rumania, 
Poland, Ukraine and Croatia. The company was privatised in 1995.168  
 
The Nr. 36 Csemege-Julius Meinl Rt. was founded in 1952; nowadays it represents a large 
super-market chain. In 1999 the company was bought by the French-Belgian Louise Delhaize 
Group, from this time Csemege-Julius Meinl Rt was renamed to Csemege-Match 
Kereskedelmi Rt.169  
 
Hungavis Külkereskedelmi Rt. / Hungavis Foreign Trade Co. Ltd. (Nr. 44) was one of 
the largest Hungarian poultry raiser, processor and selling company. Because of financial 
difficulties it was bought by Hajdú-Bét Baromfitermelő és Értékesítő Rt. in 1998, then for the 
following years it became profitable, since 2003 it had financial difficulties again and 
nowadays it is under liquidation.170
 
The Nr. 45 MKM Magyar Kábel Művek Kft. is a large producing and trading company of 
cables and power-lines for high-frequency electric currents. The company has a historical 
background of more than 125 years. It was privatised in 1993, since 2005 it operates under the 
name Prysmian MKM Magyar Kábel Művek Kft.171  
 
Borsodi Sörgyár Rt. (Nr. 48) was founded in 1973; it is the largest Hungarian brewery. The 
company was privatised in 1991, and it got under the controlling ownership of the Belgian 
Interbrew.172  
 
                                                 
167 Cereol Ltd. 
168 Dunapack Paper and Packaging Ltd. 
169 Nr. 39 Csemege-Julius Meinl Rt. 
170 Hungavis Foreign Trade Co. Ltd. 
171 MKM Magyar Kábel Művek Kft. 
172 Borsodi Sörgyár Rt. 
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The legal successor of Electrolux Lehel Hűtőgépgyár Kft. / Lehel Refrigerator Factory 
Ltd. (Nr. 49) was founded in 1953, and it became a producer of appliances and equipment for 
kitchen and cleaning. The company was privatised in 1991; today it is still in the ownership of 
the Swiss AB Electrolux.173  
 
The Nr. 50 Fővárosi Ásványvíz és Üdítőipari Rt. is a mineral water and soft drinks 
producing company. It was bought after its privatisation in 1993 by PepsiCo, and it remained 
till the present days in its ownership.174
2.2.3.5 Primary Sector 
 
The legal successor of the Nr. 18 DUNAFERR Dunai Vasmű Rt. / DUNAFERR Danube 
Ironworks Co. Ltd. was founded in 1950, and it is a large Hungarian company within the 
steel industry. It was privatised in 2003, and became foreign owned by the Ukrainian-Swiss 
Donbass-Duferco consortium.175  
 
DUNAFERR Acélművek Kft. / DUNAFERR Steelworks Ltd. (Nr. 30) is part of the 
DUNAFERR-group as well; it was merged into the previously described Nr. 19 in 2003.176  
 
The majority stake of Alcoa-Köfém Székesfehérvári Könnyűfémmű Kft. / Alcoa-Kofem 
Szekesfehervar Light Metal Works (Nr. 34) was acquired by the American Alcoa in 1993, 
and then in 1996 the company got under its 100% ownership. Alcoa-Köfem is a producer and 
manager of aluminium and alumina facilities.177  
 
2.2.4 Limitations of the Analysis 
 
First I wish to provide additional important information referring to the definition and 
identification of “the 50 larges companies in the sample years 1995 and 2003”. 
 
                                                 
173 Electrolux Lehel Hűtőgépgyár Kft. 
174 Fővárosi Ásványvíz és Üdítőipari Rt. 
175 DUNAFERR Danube Ironworks Co. Ltd. 
176 DUNAFERR Steelworks Ltd. 
177 Alcoa-Köfém Székesfehérvári Könnyűfémmű Kft. 
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The process of “tracking companies” over a time period of 8 years was a difficult and 
complicated task in general; many of them changed their names, merged into their legal 
successor or changed their field of operations during these years.  
 
I validated the data collected by using the AMADEUS database with the help of additional 
sources from the internet and with Fay (1996); by applying this procedure I managed to locate 
all company records and information needed except for three companies, this data is missing 
for the second period. As a consequence, I worked with 97 observations (instead of the 50 
observations per period, summing up to 100 total observations in theory), since company Nr. 
37 DAM-Diósgyöri Acélmüvek Rt. / Diósgyör Steelworks Industrial & Trade Shareholding 
Co. was liquidated in 1999. Sufficient data was not available for companies Nr. 6 Horizon-
Multiplan Kutatási és Fejlesztési Rt. / Horizon-Multiplan Research and Development Ltd. and 
and Nr. 25 Investor Holding Rt. 
 
In order to perform precise comparison over the time periods chosen, it was inevitable to 
include effects arising from inflation. Three calculations were based on the Consumer Price 
Index aiming to “revaluate” the affected variables. The year of 2003 was chosen to define the 
price level for reasons of comparison. I found the CPI on the official site of the Hungarian 
Central Statistical Office (KSH)178. 
 
I have chosen and ranked the “largest companies” by their size of total assets. One could have 
chosen another main indicator for the selection (e.g. profits and losses, sales, sales per 
employees, number of employees) but none of them would have provided a perfect selection 
of companies. One of the reasons for this in the differences in company types; there are 
capital-intensive firms (generally production firms) with high investments and total assets, 
and companies with high labour-intensity, where employee “skills” play a major role in the 
business, instead of high total assets.179 In consequence, other indicators might have caused 
differences in the sample and in my company ranking. 
 
Due to missing observations of the variable profits and losses after tax for the first period, I 
created and chose sales per employees as another variable for measuring the performance of 
                                                 
178 Hungarian Central Statistical Office (KSH) (3). 
179 Wikipedia - Capital intensity. 
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companies. This variable represents the ratio of company sales divided by the number of their 
employees. 
 
As another limitation to my study, I only considered the largest shareholders of the 
companies; I did not list other shareholders.  
 
Other potential mistakes could occur due to discrepancy or missing records (e.g. observations 
in the variable ultimate shareholder types); hence, I was doing my best to eliminate errors and 
to use multiple checks to achieve data for accuracy. 
 
The final fact to consider is the time scale of my study, which is the period between 1995 and 
2003. From 2003 till today some further privatisation actions took place (e.g. the privatisation 
of Gedeon Richter Plc., Antenna Hungária Magyar Műsorszóró és Rádióhírközlési Rt., etc.), 
which further changed the ownership structures of some of the companies chosen. Therefore, 
the tests do not perfectly reflect today’s outcomes and are not intended to do so, but to 
investigate the most characteristic years of the privatisation process. 
 
2.3 Logistic Regression Results 
 
In this part of my thesis I analyse the variables described to find determinants of domestic 
ownership and determinants of change (of the ultimate shareholder type). I test these variables 
with the LOGIT function of Stata_9. 
2.3.1 Domestic Ownership 
2.3.1.1 Domestic Ultimate Shareholders 
 
In this model (see Table 19), I analyse the dependent variable domestic ultimate 
shareholder01 in order to define the determinants of domestic ownership. As a reminder, the 
value of “1” stands for domestic ultimate shareholders, and the value of “0” indicates foreign 
ultimate shareholders. 
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Logistic Regression for Period 1 - Domestic Ultimate Shareholder01 
Domestic Ultimate Shareholder01 Coefficient P-Value  Log likelihood: -12.07686
Total Assets .0087108 0.012  Observations: 49 
Sales per Employees 4.051729 0.099  LR chi2(4): 42.11 
Cash Flow Rights Per Voting Rights 1.777643 0.015  Prob > chi2: 0.0000 
Pyramid Layer01 3.657224 0.005  Pseudo R2: 0.6355 
Constant -2.933405 0.014      
 
Table 19: Logistic Regression – Domestic Ultimate Shareholder01 for Period 1 
 
The tested variables of these logistic regressions are: total assets as measure of the size of the 
companies, sales per employees as measure of profitability, cash flow rights per voting rights 
to show the ratio of cash flow to voting rights and pyramid layer01 to test the number of 
pyramid layers. 
 
First of all, the P-value of 0.0000 in the first period suggests, that the overall model is 
statistically significant. The value of “Log likelihood” has no meaning in and of itself; it can 
only be used with other regressions for comparative reasons.180   
 
The independent variable total assets is significant (P-value=0.012) with its coefficient of 
0.0087108, which means that for an increase of one million USD in total assets, a small 
increase of 0.87% is expected in the domestic ultimate shareholder01, if all other independent 
variables are held constant at the same time. That way, based on the test results, there is a 
positive significant relationship at the 5% level between the two variables, signalising that 
many large companies still stayed in domestic ownership until 2003. 
 
The variable sales per employees is only significant at the 10% level with its P-value of 0.099, 
it implies a positive relationship between the performance of a company and ultimate 
domestic ownership. Finally, there is a positive relationship between the number of pyramid 
layers and domestic ownership. 
 
The positive and significant coefficients of the variables total assets and sales per employees 
are inconsistent with my expectation (1). My expectations suggest that domestic ultimate 
                                                 
180 Cp. UCLA, Academic Technology Services, Online Tutorial of Stata_9. 
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ownership is combined with low company profitability and small company size. I created two 
variables of private domestic ownership for the reason of further testing. 
 
Logistic Regression for Period 2 – Domestic Ultimate Shareholder01 
Domestic Ultimate Shareholder01 Coefficient P-Value  Log likelihood: -25.900636 
Total Assets .0002859 0.372  Observations: 44 
Sales per Employees -.07163 0.832  LR chi2(4): 7.73 
Cash Flow Rights Per Voting Rights .0235003 0.017  Prob > chi2: 0.1019 
Pyramid Layer01 1.04401 0.217  Pseudo R2: 0.1299 
Constant -3.682783 0.015      
 
Table 20: Logistic Regression – Domestic Ultimate Shareholder01 for Period 2 
 
The overall test result of the variable domestic ultimate shareholder01 is statistically not 
significant in the second period (see Table 20). 
2.3.1.2 Private Domestic Ownership I 
 
The variable private domestic ownership01 was created in order to differentiate among the 
ultimate shareholder types. The difference to the dependent variable described above is the 
restriction, that state observations (of great quantities) do not belong to the variable value of 
“1” (=private domestic ownership) any more, but to the value of “0” in line with ultimate 
foreign ownership. Therefore, its value of “0” stands for state and ultimate foreign ownership 
and “1” stands for domestic ownerships only.  
In the following two logistic regressions, I do not test the dummy variable pyramid layer01, 
because it weakens the test results significantly by dropping half of my observations. 
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Logistic Regression for Period 1 – Private Domestic Ownership01 
Private Domestic Ownership01 Coefficient P-Value  Log likelihood: 
-
17.481261
Total Assets .0000341 0.871  Observations: 49 
Sales per Employees .4290148 0.587  LR chi2(3): 1.47 
Cash Flow Rights Per Voting Rights .0340792 0.391  Prob > chi2: 0.6889 
Constant -5.352969 0.181  Pseudo R2: 0.0404 
Logistic Regression for Period 2 – Private Domestic Ownership01 
Private Domestic Ownership01 Coefficient P-Value  Log likelihood: 
-
8.7766212
Total Assets -.0044506 0.266  Observations: 44 
Sales per Employees -24.41965 0.074  LR chi2(3): 9.25 
Cash Flow Rights Per Voting Rights -.0027624 0.871  Prob > chi2: 0.0261 
Constant 1.959374 0.382  Pseudo R2: 0.3452 
 
Table 21: Logistic Regression – Private Domestic Ownership01 
 
In this logistic regression I estimate the relationship between the dependent variable private 
domestic ownership01 and the independent variables total assets, sales per employees and 
cash flow rights of ultimate shareholders (see Table 21).  
In the first period, the overall test result of the dependent variable has no statistical 
significance for the independent variables. 
 
The regression is statistically significant with its P-Value of 0.0261 in the second period and 
the coefficient of the independent variable sales per employee is also significant with the 
tested variable private domestic ownership01 at the 10% level. As described earlier, the 
variable sales per employee is responsible for measuring the company’s profitability. 
Therefore, its negative relationship implies that an increase in the profitability of the 
companies results in decreased domestic ownership. 
 
This statement corresponds to expectation (1) and to the theory of Voszta (2005) and Belyó 
(2005), stating that the privatisation, driven by foreign investors especially, results in capital 
inflows through increases in share capital and modernizations of technology, contributing 
among others to higher company profitability. 
The other two independent variables are both in negative relationship with the dependent 
variable. 
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2.3.1.3 Private Domestic Ownership II 
 
I dropped all the observations of “state” as the largest ultimate shareholder in order to test the 
variable private domestic ownership01 (dropped state). This way the value of the variable “0” 
stands for ultimate foreign ownership alone, while “1” stands for private domestic ownership. 
In consequence of the dropped “state” records, the number of test observations significantly 
decreased. 
 
Logistic Regression for Period 1 - Private Domestic Ownership01 (dropped state) 
Private Domestic Ownership01 
(dropped state) Coefficient P-Value  Log likelihood: -3.4759647 
Total Assets .0202313 0.145  Observations: 26 
Sales per Employees 11.19323 0.146  LR chi2(3): 21.14 
Cash Flow Rights Per Voting Rights 4.148879 0.158  Prob > chi2: 0.0001 
Constant -428.5853 0.158  Pseudo R2: 0.7525 
Logistic Regression for Period 2 - Private Domestic Ownership01 (dropped state) 
Private Domestic Ownership01 
(dropped state) Coefficient P-Value  Log likelihood: -5.1615622 
Total Assets -.0034029 0.482  Observations: 30 
Sales per Employees -43.10378 0.050  LR chi2(3): 13.24 
Cash Flow Rights Per Voting Rights .0053731 0.777  Prob > chi2: 0.0042 
Constant 4.095767 0.172  Pseudo R2: 0.5618 
 
Table 22: Logistic Regression – Private Domestic Ownership01 
 
In this logistic regression (see Table 22) I test the dependent variable private domestic 
ownership01 (dropped state) to find potential relationships with the independent variables of 
total assets, sales per employees and cash flow rights of ultimate shareholders.  
In the first period, the P-value of the model is 0.0001; therefore the overall regression is 
statistically significant. Although none of the independent variables are significant in respect 
to the dependent variable.  
 
In the second period, the overall model is statistically significant (P-Value equals 0.0042), and 
the tested variable private domestic ownership01 (dropped state) has a significant relationship 
to the independent variable sales per employee at a 5% level. As one can see, this result is 
similar to the previous regression of the variable private domestic ownership01 and 
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corresponds to my expectation (1), that domestic ultimate ownership is combined with low 
company profitability. 
The variable total assets is in positive, while cash flow rights of ultimate shareholders stands 
in negative relationship with the dependent variable. 
 
Due to the restriction of dropped state observations mentioned above, only a small number of 
26 (30) company records remained. This fact might decrease the relevance of this regression. 
2.3.2 Change 
 
In this part of my study, I analyse the variable change01 (of ultimate shareholder types) to 
find its determinants. 
 
Logistic Regression for Period 1 - Change01 (A) 
Change01 Coefficient P-Value  Log likelihood: -27.217572 
Total Assets -.0003304 0.150  Observations: 47 
Sales per Employees .3220672 0.739  LR chi2(4): 10.19 
Shareholder Direct -.0244009 0.091  Prob > chi2: 0.0374 
Pyramid Layer01 -1.116493 0.123  Pseudo R2: 0.1576 
Constant 3.022069 0.020      
 
Table 23: Logistic Regression – Change01 for Period 1 (A) 
 
I tested the relationship of the variables total assets, sales per employees, shareholder direct 
and pyramid layers01 with the dependent variable change01 (see Table 23). The overall, 
statistically significant test of the logistic regression results in the significant independent 
variable of shareholder direct at the 5% level, which stands in negative relation to the 
variable change01. Therefore, an increase in the ownership of the largest direct shareholder 
has less change as effect in ultimate shareholder ownership. 
 
I test the variable change01 with the ultimate shareholder types to find the determinants of 
change in the ultimate layer. I choose the three largest ultimate shareholder types as dummy 
variables of state01, family01 and other financial institution01. The results are summarised in 
Table 24. 
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Logistic Regression for Period 1 – Change01 (B) 
Change01 Coefficient P-Value  Log likelihood: -24.9109 
Total Assets -.000278 0.224  Observations: 47 
Sales per Employees .0203087 0.987  LR chi2(6): 14.80 
Cash Flow Rights Per Voting Rights .0228268 0.149  Prob > chi2: 0.0219 
Ultimate Shareholder Type State01 -2.354396 0.008  Pseudo R2: 0.2290 
Ultimate Shareholder Type Financial01 -1.069372 0.550      
Ultimate Shareholder Type Family01 -.9655533 0.437      
Constant -.0645489 0.964      
 
Table 24: Logistic Regression – Change01 for Period 1 (B) 
 
This logistic regression has an overall statistically significant result (P-Value equals 0.0219), 
and the dependent variable change01 stands in a significant negative relationship to the 
ultimate shareholder type “state” at the 1% level (P-value= 0.008). According to this result, 
state ownership leads to a lower probability of change in ultimate shareholder type. 
 
To investigate the relationship of “state” as an ultimate shareholder with the variable 
change01 in more detail, I created the new variable Hungarian state01. It distinguishes only 
two different conditions: the Hungarian state and other ultimate shareholder types. Its value of 
“0” stands for all non Hungarian state observations, and “1” represents records of the 
Hungarian state. 
 
Logistic Regression for Period 1 - Change01 (C) 
Change01 Coefficient P-Value  Log likelihood: -23.77471 
Total Assets -.0002064 0.323  Observations: 47 
Sales per Employees -.0508935 0.969  LR chi2(5): 17.07 
Cash Flow Rights Per Voting Rights .0612044 0.052  Prob > chi2: 0.0044 
Hungarian State01 -4.585523 0.044  Pseudo R2: 0.2642 
Pyramid Layer01 2.828813 0.201      
Constant -4.413363 0.154      
 
Table 25: Logistic Regression – Change01 for Period 1 (C) 
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This statistically significant result (see Table 25) of the logistic regression (P-Value=0.0044) 
has two significant independent variables; the dependent variable change01 stands in negative 
relationship at the 5% level with the newly created variable Hungarian state01, and it is in 
positive relation to the independent variable cash flow rights per voting rights at the 10% 
level (P-Value of 0.052). This test result corresponds to expectation (3) as well, meaning that 
a decrease in state ownership leads to a higher probability of change in ultimate shareholder 
type. 
 
The positive relationship between the variable cash flow rights per voting rights and the 
dependent variable shows that a larger deviation of cash flow from control rights leads to less 
change in the ultimate shareholder type. The overall result of increased cash flow rights per 
voting rights corresponds to my expectation (2) that ultimate owners value control if they are 
not intending to sell the company, since they enjoy private benefits of control. 
 
Therefore, we can conclude that the previously described changes in ownership structures are 
related to the desire for having control.  
 
2.4 Conclusions of the Empirical Study 
 
The results of the summary tables show a decrease in the ultimate domestic ownership (from 
60% to 42%) and an increase in the number of foreign ultimate investors. The 50 largest 
Hungarian companies have very concentrated ownership structures; the largest direct 
shareholders average direct ownership accounts for 74% (71% in the first period), while the 
largest ultimate shareholders have cash flow rights of 47% in average (62% in the second 
period). 
The mean number of pyramid layers decreased according to the values observed in the second 
period of the privatisation process (companies with one layer ranging from 36% to 23%; 
companies with two layers ranging from 42% to 38%), while the number of structures 
including three or more pyramid layers increased. The role of the state, as the largest 
shareholder, has definitely decreased in importance throughout the privatisation process. The 
second period of my study; shows that the percentage of “state”/”privatisation fund” as the 
largest direct owners decreased from 34% to 15%, while the percentage of state as the largest 
ultimate owner decreased from 48% to 32%. 
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Some results were contradictory to my initial expectation (1), described at the beginning of 
section 3: Logistic Regression Results. One of these results is the following: The dependent 
variable ultimate shareholder domestic01 has a significant positive relation to the independent 
variables total assets at the 5% level and to sales per employees at the 10% level. According 
to this relation an increase in these variables determines a higher level of domestic ownership. 
Based on my expectation (1), domestic ultimate ownership is connected to low profitability 
and small company size in Hungary. Therefore, I would expect a negative relationship among 
the variables sales per employees (states the profitability of a company) and total assets 
(states the size of the company) and domestic ultimate ownership. 
  
The logistic regression including the dependent variable private domestic ownership01 stands 
in a negative relationship with the variable sales per employees. It states that a decrease 
profitability of these companies results in an increase in private domestic ownership. This 
statement corresponds to expectation (1), stating that foreign ownership results in higher 
company profitability, as one of many effects, due to share capital increases and investment in 
technology. The following logistic regression including the variable private domestic 
ownership01 (dropped state) also underlines this result. 
 
The logistic regression of the variable change01 implies a negative significant relationship to 
the independent variable shareholder direct at 5 % level; in consequence, a decrease in the 
percentage of voting rights determines a change in the ultimate ownership types. 
In the final logistic regression, the independent variable Hungarian state01 stands in negative 
relation to the dependent variable change01 at the 5% significance level. It underlines 
expectation (3), according to which an increase in the number cases where the Hungarian state 
is the largest ultimate shareholder, determinates less change in the ultimate ownership types. 
 
The other positive significant relationship of change01 with the independent variable cash 
flow rights per voting rights corresponds to my expectation (2) that ultimate owners value 
control if they are not intending to sell the company, since they enjoy private benefits of 
control. 
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3 Final Conclusions 
 
 
The previous chapter of Conclusions of the Empirical Study reveals the most important results 
of my study. 
 
The Hungarian privatisation process became a major part of the Hungarian politics, which 
resulted in the increase of foreign ownership especially from the middle of the 90’s. The 
reputation and perception of the privatisation process were mostly negative and very much 
associated with inequalities and corruption.  
 
The importance of ultimate state ownership is decreasing in proportion with increasing 
foreign ultimate investors. The concentrated structure of the Hungarian ownership is under the 
strong control of large scale investors.  
 
The test results show that a larger deviation of cash flow from control rights leads to less 
change in the ultimate shareholder type. In consequence, ultimate owners seek more control 
and influence over the companies under their possession. 
 
Surprisingly state ownership leads to a lower probability of change in ultimate shareholder 
type. This means that despite privatization, private firms change types of ultimate owners 
even more often than the state, at least during transition. 
 
By working on this study, I have learned various methods of logistic regressions and testing in 
line with efficient data searching and analysis methods. I also managed to further increase my 
understanding of how to combine theory and practice within a research process.  
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Download date: 20. 11. 2007 
 
Mátra Power Plant Ltd.: 
http://www.mert.hu/
Download date: 21. 11. 2007 
 
MKM Magyar Kábel Művek Kft.: 
http://www.hu.prysmian.com/hu_HU/cables_systems/energy/index_energy_hu.jhtml
Download date: 28. 11. 2007 
 
Nitrokémia Rt. (1): 
http://www.nitro.hu/
Download date: 24. 11. 2007 
 
Nitrokémia Rt. (2): 
http://www.kfki.hu/chemonet/mkl/mkl98/mkl5/vegyi2.html
Download date: 24. 11. 2007 
 
North-Hungarian Electricity Supply Co. Ltd.: 
http://www.emasz.hu/cegtortenet_emasz.php
Download date: 22. 11. 2007 
 
North-West Hungarian Electricity Supply Co. Ltd.: 
http://www.eon-hungaria.com/vallalat/eoncsoport/eszakdunantuliaramszolgaltato/cegtortenet/
Download date: 22. 11. 2007 
 
Opel Magyarország Autóipari Kft.: 
http://www.opel.hu/site/footer/about2.html
Download date: 25. 11. 2007 
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Paks Nuclear Power Plant Ltd.: 
http://www.mvm-csoport.hu/index.php?in=www.atomeromu.hu
Download date: 21. 11. 2007 
 
Pannon GSM Telecommunications Ltd.: 
http://www.pannon.hu/pannon/sajtoszoba/ceginformaciok/bemutatkozas/
Download date: 20. 11. 2007 
 
Siemens Telephone Factory Ltd.: 
http://www.freeweb.hu/muvelodes/okossag.doc
Download date: 21. 11. 2007 
 
South-Hungarian Electricity Supply Co. Ltd.: 
http://www.demasz.hu/pages/aloldal.jsp?id=1018
Download date: 21. 11. 2007 
 
South Hungarian Gas Supply Co. Ltd.: 
http://www.egaz-degaz.hu/hu/tars_cegtortenet.html
Download date: 22. 11. 2007 
 
South-West Hungarian Electricity Supply Co. Ltd.: 
http://www.eon-deldunantul.com/vallalat/eoncsoport/deldunantuliaramszolgaltato/cegtortenet/
Download date: 22. 11. 2007 
 
TIGÁZ Tiszántúli Gázszolgáltató Rt.: 
http://www.tigaz.hu/engine.aspx?page=Tigazzrt_fejlodes
Download date: 22. 11. 2007 
 
Tiszai Vegyi Kombinát Rt. (TVK Rt.): 
http://www.tvk.hu/hu/a_tvkrol/tarsasagunkrol/tortenetunk/torteneti_attekintes/
Download date: 24. 11. 2007 
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Vértes Power Plant Co. Ltd.: 
http://www.vert.hu/vert.tortenet.htm
Download date: 21. 11. 2007 
 
Waterworks of Budapest Ltd.: 
http://www.vizmuvek.hu/pages?p=1
Download date: 22. 11. 2007 
 
Westel Mobile Telephone Company: 
http://www.t-mobile.hu/egyeni/rolunk/ceginformaciok/cegtortenet/index.shtml
Download date: 20. 11. 2007 
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Appendix 2 – Abstract in German 
 
Im Rahmen meiner Arbeit habe ich die Theorie und Praxis der ungarischen Privatisierung 
beleuchtet und ihre Zusammenwirkung durch eine Analyse der 50 größten ungarischen 
Unternehmen geprüft. 
 
Im ersten Teil meiner Diplomarbeit beschreibe ich den Prozess der Privatisierung beginnend 
1987 bis zu den heutigen Tagen. 
In Ungarn hängt die Privatisierung eng mit der Politik und mit der Entwicklung der 
Marktwirtschaft zusammen, viele weisen aus diesem Grund auf einen „zyklischen“ Ablauf 
der Privatisierung, bedingt durch die häufigen Regierungswechsel in diesem Zeitraum hin. 
Für die Jahre zwischen 1990 und 1994 sind die Einführung der meisten Gesetze und die 
Förderung von inländischen Investoren charakteristisch. 
Nach 1994 hat sich die Richtung der Privatisierung durch die neue Regierung geändert, 
welche die möglichst schnelle Privatisierung der Firmen zum Hauptziel hatte, und 
ausländische Investoren als die dafür am besten geeignete Zielgruppe empfand. 
Nach dem Millennium hat der Privatisierungsprozess aus Bedeutung verloren, spielt aber 
heutzutage dennoch eine besondere Rolle. 
 
Im zweiten Teil meiner Diplomarbeit habe ich die Veränderungen in den 50 größten 
Ungarischen Unternehmen während der Privatisierung beschrieben. 
Diese Unternehmen habe ich zum Zecke meiner Studie nach der Höhe ihrer Bilanzsumme 
bestimmt, als charakteristische Zeitpunkte der Privatisierung habe ich die Jahre 1995 (1. 
Periode) und 2003 (2. Periode) identifiziert. Drei der Firmen konnte ich in der Analyse der 2. 
Periode nicht mehr berücksichtigen, da zu zwei keine Unternehmensdaten zur Verfügung 
standen und eine aufgelöst wurde. 
Im Rahmen des empirischen Teils habe ich zunächst mittels der Anwendung Excel die 
größten Unternehmen nach 75 Variablen und auf zwei Perioden aufgeteilt dargestellt. Die 
hierfür verwendeten Daten stammen aus der Datenbank Amadeus, aus Internetquellen und aus 
Fay (1996). Die vorhergehende historische Beschreibung der Firmen war von wesentlicher 
Hilfe bei der Kontrolle der gefundenen Daten. 
Anhand der ausgesuchten Variablen habe ich mich auf die Darstellung der Eigentümerstruktur 
der Unternehmen konzentriert, wobei ich bei meiner Beschreibung der Unternehmensstufen 
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mit gezieltem Fokus auf die Eigentümertypen „Staat“ und „Ausländischen Investoren“ 
eingegangen bin. 
Durch Zuhilfenahme des statistischen Softwareprogramms Stata_9 habe ich die 
Ausprägungen der durch die ungarische Privatisierung verursachten Änderungen in der 
entsprechenden Zeitperiode beschrieben und anschließend logistische Regressionen mit den 
wesentlichsten Variablen meiner Arbeit durchgeführt, um die für die Änderungen der 
ungarischer Eigentümerstruktur und größten Aktionären verantwortliche Determinanten zu 
bestimmen. 
Die Testergebnisse der logistischen Regressionen haben zunächst den abnehmenden Einfluss 
des Staates als Eigentümer, die steigende Anzahl der ausländischen Investoren und die 
steigende Zahl der Unternehmensstufen der größten Aktionären bestätigt, weiters hat sich 
noch als Ergebnis ein negativer Zusammenhang zwischen der Höhe der Beteiligung des 
größten Aktionärs der ersten Stufe und der Änderung der Aktienärentyp der letzten 
Eigentümerstufe herausgestellt. Unter anderem ist noch die erhöhte Produktivität der Firmen 
im ausländischen Eigentum erwähnenswert. 
Als Gesamtergebnis dieser Studie kann eine Zusammenführung der Praxis und der Theorie 
auf diesem Bereich angeführt werden. 
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